

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

MAY, 1973

EAST EUROPE, 1973

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Current History

MAY, 1973

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In this issue seven articles explore changing conditions in the nations of East Europe. Our introductory article points out that "the climate appears favorable for further détente between the United States and East Europe."

The United States and East Europe

BY ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI
*Associate Professor of Political Science,
University of California at Los Angeles*

IT IS PROBABLY no exaggeration to say that the international scene underwent a radical transformation at the beginning of the 1970's. President Richard Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow in the first half of 1972 symbolized the opening of a new chapter in East-West relations and the ultimate end of the cold war. Above all, the dramatic change in international relations affected the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and China and Japan, but its repercussions were felt throughout most of the globe, including both parts of Europe. Hence it is not surprising that United States policy toward East Europe has reflected the apparent determination of the Washington policy-makers to break away from the traditional mold which had dominated relations between the United States and Communist Europe for the last quarter of a century.

The story of this relationship has been discussed in this journal in the past and need not be repeated here.¹ Suffice it to say that American policy during three successive administrations—from Dwight Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson—could be described essentially as "no policy." Despite occasional statements to the contrary, East Europe (with one or two exceptions) was viewed by Washington as an absolute domain of Moscow; the American policy toward the area was largely a dependent variable of United States-Soviet relationship. To be sure, there has been a fair amount of official talk about "bridge building"; there were pontifications about the need to differen-

tiate among the individual members of the socialist camp; there was an expansion in cultural and economic relations—yet all of these presented an image of an *ad hoc*, improvised policy without focus or long-range objectives.

There were good reasons for this lack of clear-cut policy. Perhaps most important was the belief that East Europe did not offer a promising target for American initiatives. Despite several rather obvious signals emanating from the area indicating that the Stalinist monolith was long dead, policy-makers in successive administrations refused to accept this fact even when faced with signs of dynamic changes. Thus it was commonly believed that any attempt at "peaceful engagement" in East Europe was bound to antagonize the Soviet Union, which would not tolerate even the slightest interference in its sphere of interest. Moreover, ever since the early 1960's Washington was engaged in a more or less subtle effort to reach some kind of an accommodation with Moscow, and East Europe was perceived as adding an unnecessary factor to an already complex equation. The almost studied American indifference with regard to the Prague "Spring of 1968" was undoubtedly a by-product of this belief.

The second reason was the almost total American preoccupation with Vietnam and the subsequent neglect of other areas, including Europe. While one would expect a great power to be able to conduct its foreign policy simultaneously on several fronts, it soon became clear that in the atmosphere of the mid- and late 1960's, the voices of the Europeanists in government councils were by and large ignored. The war in Southeast Asia and the growing domestic crisis

¹ "U.S. Policy in East Europe," *Current History*, March, 1965, and "East Europe and the United States," *ibid.*, April, 1969.

monopolized the attention of decision-makers at the expense of other crucial areas.

Third, as mentioned earlier, East Europe was not perceived as a promising opportunity. Historically, the area has always been regarded as being of marginal importance to the United States; moreover, it tended to be a source of embarrassment for Washington from the time of the Teheran (1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam (1945) conferences, through the era of "containment" and the abortive Dullesian doctrine of "liberation," to the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and the almost callous disregard of the Czechoslovak "Spring of 1968." Hence, East Europe spelled trouble, and one tested method of avoiding trouble is to do nothing or, at least, very little.

Thus at the end of the 1960's, the American policy toward East Europe was characterized by a mixture of inertia and improvisation, and there was hardly any indication of the dramatic changes which were to take place in the next two years. Since much has been written about the recent "revolution" in international relations there is no need to cover a largely familiar ground in detail. However, in order to put United States policy toward Communist Europe in the proper perspective, it is necessary to emphasize the impact of some crucial changes in the international environment.

CRUCIAL CHANGES

One of them, undoubtedly, was a growing acceptance of the view that the old bipolar world was disintegrating, and that it was being rapidly replaced by a new multipolar configuration. It did not matter much whether the transformation was real or imaginary: it was perceived as real, and as such it provided

legitimacy as well as a stimulus for seeking new approaches to the solution of outstanding international problems.²

The search for a new policy was especially visible in the area of East-West relations in general and United States-Soviet relations in particular. Since American policy vis-à-vis East Europe has traditionally been a function of these relationships, the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, interrupted temporarily by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, and resumed in late 1969 when the SALT negotiations began at Helsinki, contributed significantly to a reduction of the tension which had characterized East-West relations since the end of World War II. The détente had several consequences: on the one hand, apparently convinced of the Soviet determination to reach an agreement, Washington felt less constrained to maintain Moscow's good will and to worry about Soviet sensitivity with respect to American initiatives on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership, eager to secure its flanks in the face of the continuing conflict with China and economic difficulties at home, was willing to permit a higher degree of American political and economic penetration of the former satellites than heretofore.

It is to the great credit of the Nixon administration that it took advantage of favorable circumstances and made bold moves in initiating a new approach to East Europe, an approach manifested in the President's official visits to Rumania and Yugoslavia in 1969 and 1970. One should not underestimate the importance of these visits, the first by an American President to either country. While it was generally recognized that Yugoslavia occupied a unique position between East and West, Rumania, for all her attempts to assert an independent stance, was a charter member of both the Warsaw Treaty and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, and as such, formally at least, was a member of the Soviet-dominated "socialist alliance." President Nixon's visit to Bucharest could only be interpreted both as a challenge to the thus far undisputed Soviet control of the area and as a test of Moscow's commitment to rapprochement.³ It is clear that the absence of strong Soviet reaction to that particular trip indicated that Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's regime was determined to reach an understanding with the United States at almost any price.

The President's Rumanian venture could be viewed not only as a test of Soviet intentions but also as an attempt to introduce new dynamic elements into American foreign policy. While still largely preoccupied with the solution of the Vietnam conflict, the Republican administration which took over at the beginning of 1969 was apparently willing to disregard cold war taboos and to chart a bold new course in such areas as China and East Europe.⁴ Insofar as

² "The Altered Shape of World Power," Address by the Under-secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson before the Advertising Council, Washington, D.C., June 9, 1969. *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 14, 1969, p. 29.

³ Secretary of State Rogers' new conferences of July 2 and August 20, 1969. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1969, pp. 42-43 and September 8, 1969, pp. 206-207.

⁴ "We are aware that the Soviet Union sees its own security as directly affected by developments in this region. Several times, over the centuries, Russia has been invaded through Central Europe; so this sensitivity is not novel, or purely the product of Communist dogma. It is not the intention of the United States to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. The time is certainly past, with the development of modern technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly no part of our policy. Our pursuit of negotiations and détente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones. By the same token, the United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith. And we can accept no doctrine that abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others. We are prepared to enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe, looking to a gradual normalization of relations. We will adjust ourselves to whatever pace and extent of normalization these countries are willing to sustain." "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's," A Report to the Congress by the President. *The New York Times*, February 19, 1970.

East Europe was concerned, the decision to resume "peaceful engagement" was presumably motivated not only by the desire to move from the "era of confrontation" to the "era of negotiation" but also, at least indirectly, by the apparent success of similar policies pursued first by French President Charles de Gaulle and subsequently by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. While the French policy symbolized by the General's visits to Warsaw and Bucharest was clearly intended to assert France's emancipation from American tutelage, the West German initiative which culminated in the treaties between Bonn and Moscow and Warsaw in 1970 had a much deeper meaning and a much greater impact.

OSTPOLITIK

The recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as the western frontier of Poland, to be followed later by the settlement of the Berlin issue and the agreement to recognize East Germany as a separate German state, meant that in a relatively short time the *Ostpolitik* managed to accomplish the three seemingly impossible tasks which heretofore had eluded the Bonn governments of Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard and Ludwig Kiesinger. Remarkably, the new policy was overwhelmingly approved by the West German electorate in November, 1972. Chancellor Brandt had correctly gauged the German people's determination to let bygones be bygones and to initiate a new *modus vivendi* with its Eastern neighbors.

There is no clearcut evidence to suggest that the *Ostpolitik* has had any major impact on United States policy in East Europe, but it is clear that in contrast to the French initiative it was taken very seriously in Washington. There were signs, for example, that an important segment of American public opinion (including such well known former architects of United States policy in Europe as Dean Acheson, Lucius Clay and John McCloy) was highly critical of the Bonn endeavors to normalize relations with Moscow and Warsaw, maintaining that West Germany was making most of the concessions while getting relatively little in return.⁵ The Nixon administration should again receive credit for taking great pains to emphasize its support for Chancellor Brandt's policy of reconciliation with the East. It can be argued that Washington could hardly do otherwise in view of its own commitment to seek accommodation. In the final analysis, the American and German policies reinforced one another and succeeded in convincing their respective critics to support the new approach.

THE NEW AMERICAN INITIATIVE

There is little doubt that the new American initiative toward East Europe would not have progressed very far if it had not generated a positive reaction.

Previous approaches to the area (pursued by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) may have failed partly because they did not evoke a favorable response in East European capitals. It may be argued that the Nixon administration was lucky, but this is too simple an explanation. To be sure, the international configuration was clearly favorable to new initiatives. But it must also be assumed that Washington's assurances that the United States was seeking rapprochement and nothing else were so convincing that they were taken at face value by Communist leaders in Moscow and other East European capitals.

In general, responses to foreign policy initiatives tend to be heavily influenced by a perception of the adversary's intentions. After all, similar conciliatory statements had been issued by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, yet for one reason or another they were not perceived as representing a major breakthrough in American attitudes to the Communist world. One reason may have been the fact that the Nixon administration initiatives were confined primarily to concrete issues of major interest to the Soviet Union rather than to East Europe (e.g., the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or the Nonproliferation Treaty). It is also possible that the pronouncements were worded so that they did not antagonize American public opinion, which was seen as hostile to the idea of negotiating with the Communists while conducting a war against Communist North Vietnam. In hindsight, it is clear that the Democratic administrations had misjudged the temper of the American people, an error that was not repeated by the Republicans. The signals from Washington—beginning with President Nixon's inaugural address and repeated with regular frequency by the Secretary and Undersecretary of State and other State Department officials—were apparently perceived as representing a fundamental switch in American policy toward the Communist world in Europe and Asia. The Communist leaders, for reasons of their own, could not afford to ignore the signals.

Apparently, the Brezhnev regime was eager to resume negotiations leading to the détente with the United States, negotiations which had been suspended following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union continued to be challenged by China; it was experiencing serious economic setbacks at home; East Europe was proving increasingly difficult to manage; and the burden of reaching and maintaining nuclear parity with the United States while simultaneously trying to raise the living standards of the Soviet people was obviously taking its toll. The achievement of nuclear parity with the United States meant that for the first time since the end of World War II Moscow was able to face Washington as an equal instead of from a position of strategic inferiority—a fact that was likely to make negotiations easier. In any event,

⁵ *The New York Times*, December 20 and 22, 1970.

nothing reflected the Soviet desire for rapprochement more clearly than Moscow's refusal to cancel the visit of President Nixon in May, 1972, although he had just decided to escalate the war in Southeast Asia by mining the coast of North Vietnam—a Soviet ally.

The individual East European countries also reacted almost enthusiastically to the new American initiative. In the case of Poland, the positive response coincided with a changeover in the Communist party's leadership. The new leader, Edward Gierek, who enjoyed the reputation of being a hard-nosed pragmatist, appeared openly sympathetic toward closer contacts with the West, including the United States. Despite considerable Soviet pressure to conform, Rumania continued to play the role of Communist maverick and President Nixon's visit to Bucharest, followed by Rumanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu's trip to the United States, was welcomed as a reaffirmation of American support for Rumania's independent stance. The same can be roughly said about Yugoslavia, which persisted in pursuing a middle path between East and West. The Janos Kadar regime in Hungary, which until recently had been practically excommunicated by Washington in memory of the 1956 revolt, also reacted favorably, leaving only Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany refusing to budge, at least for the time being. The Nixon visit to Warsaw and the visit of United States Secretary of State William Rogers to Bucharest and Budapest in the first half of 1972 provided tangible proof that in the broad context of East-West rapprochement East Europe would not be ignored.

Where do we go from here? It is clear that if Washington is firmly committed to the continuation of the policy of détente with East Europe then it is imperative that the momentum generated in the past four years not be lost. The atmosphere for further dialogue could hardly be more favorable. The end of the Vietnam War and the signing of the treaty recognizing the existence of two German states removed two of the last remaining major obstacles to better understanding between East and West. The Soviet and East European attitudes toward continued détente with the United States appear to be as positive as ever. Thus while the last mass American bombing offensive against North Vietnam in the closing days of 1972 met with a sharp negative reaction among American allies throughout the world, both the Soviet Union and East Europe maintained almost total silence. The start of three parallel series of East-West negotiations (SALT 2, the European Security Conference, and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations) also provided concrete testimony of the apparent willingness of both sides to continue the dialogue.

While security considerations are likely to occupy a prominent place in the discussions, economic prob-

lems are only one step behind. All available evidence suggests that neither the Soviet Union nor East Europe has been able to solve its economic difficulties. In East Europe (with the possible exception of Yugoslavia and Hungary, both of which managed to implement a series of reforms which resulted in a considerable improvement in the performance of their economies), the reforms have been partial and sporadic, and have not prevented a decline in the rate of economic growth, balance of payments difficulties, and even the threat of unemployment.

The East European regimes apparently came to the conclusion that one of the major reasons for the unsatisfactory performance of their economic systems was the growing technological gap between East and West. Consequently, they have expressed hope that one of the by-products of the détente would be a major expansion of economic relations with the United States, with the latter willing to extend credits, to supply technology, and to provide the know-how. The expectation of a major increase in economic contacts with the United States also stemmed from the facts that the European Economic Community has expanded to include Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark and that the EEC plans to introduce new restrictions on trade with non-members. Thus West Europe, which has been the principal supplier of know-how and technology, may no longer be able to play that role. The only alternatives appear to be the United States and Japan, and for a number of reasons the United States is apparently preferred by East Europeans.

Insofar as the United States is concerned, the overwhelming reelection of President Nixon in November, 1972, can be taken as proof that a large majority of the American electorate approved his foreign policy, of which the détente with East Europe formed an integral part. It can be speculated that with American involvement in Vietnam at an end, the attention of the administration may well focus once again on Europe. The enlargement of EEC and the recent financial crisis resulting in another devaluation of the dollar may indicate that economic problems can easily become as important as political or strategic considerations. This is likely to help rather than hinder further rapprochement with East Europe, which is keenly interested in increasing East-West trade. Faced with persistent balance of payments

(Continued on page 226)

Andrzej Korbonski, author of *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), did research on Soviet bloc economies at Columbia from 1956 to 1963. He is at work on two new books on East European politics and economics. In 1970-1971, he was at the Ford Foundation on leave from the University of California.

"The most important challenge facing Gierek is to place the economy on a sound footing."

Poland: Old Wine in New Bottles?

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

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EVER SINCE THE OUSTER of Polish Communist party leader Władysław Gomułka some 30 months ago and his replacement by Edward Gierek,¹ impressive changes have taken place within Poland's top leadership and, to a lesser extent, in its policies. Changes in both leadership and policies were ratified successively at the Sixth Congress of the ruling Polish United Workers' party (P.Z.P.R.—*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*) during early December, 1971, and in national elections to Parliament in mid-March, 1972—the latter followed by organization of a new government. Even the Soviet leadership appeared satisfied, if not pleased, with the role played by Poland under Gierek in bloc as well as in world affairs.

Formal justification in support of policy changes appeared in the P.Z.P.R. Central Committee report,² covering the period since November, 1968, i.e., between the last two party congresses. It included harsh criticism of the previous economic planning system and top administration, which was accused of (1) disregarding the importance of wage levels that had been frozen; (2) lack of control over implementation of Central Committee resolutions; (3) a faulty administrative system that had precipitated "incorrect" solutions to problems; (4) concentration on secondary matters in violation of cadres policy; (5) continuation of traditional planning methods which had led to contradictions; and (6) depriving the government of responsibility for administration, with the party leadership deciding even minor details.³

However, no comprehensive discussion of the Gomułka period and its deficiencies followed. After the above general critique, the Central Committee report included a 13-page assessment of socio-economic policy since December, 1970. It presented a self-congratulatory exposé of alleged accomplishments by the new ruling party and government elite in overcoming the political crisis and eliminating or ameliorating some economic difficulties. In the latter area, the plan for 1971 underwent modification to increase production of consumers' goods as well as imports of meat, lard, cocoa, citrus fruit; to raise the level of exports; to import more raw materials for light industry; to devote more attention to the needs of society; to make available larger funds for housing construction.

In agriculture, conditions for stimulating animal husbandry were accompanied by the elimination on January 1, 1972, of compulsory farm deliveries and the raising of wholesale prices for food commodities. Simplified regulations were introduced to transfer land from retired peasants without heirs to state and collective farms or agricultural circles. Socialized medicine and free medical attention were finally extended to rural areas,⁴ after more than a quarter-century of Communist rule.

THE RULING PARTY

This same Central Committee report distinguished between faulty implementation of policies by the Gomułka leadership and the "generally correct political line of the party, which has been verified in the life of the population and has become a source of great [national] achievement."⁵ This is allegedly reflected in the party's social composition, which includes a substantial number of white collar workers or intelligentsia. (See Table I.)

The more than 2.2 million members and candidates for membership are organized into 72,600 primary party organizations at places of work or residential areas, in addition to some 3,000 such units throughout the armed forces. A purge of P.Z.P.R. members who

¹ For the circumstances surrounding this event, see "New Course in Communist-Ruled Poland?" *Current History*, May, 1971, pp. 269-275.

² P.Z.P.R., *VI Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej: 6-11 grudnia 1971* [Sixth Congress of the P.Z.P.R.: December 6-11, 1971] (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1972), pp. 7-77; henceforth, cited as *VI Zjazd*.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

⁴ Gierek revealed that national health services cost the government 4.4 billion zlotys per annum. Speaking to the trade union congress, he welcomed the proposal that an additional 2.2 billion zlotys be raised, each year from voluntary contributions. Warsaw Radio, November 13, 1972.

⁵ *VI Kongres*, p. 65.

were passive or even "antagonistic toward the party and the country" took place during 1971. About 100,000 persons were dropped from the rolls, presumably in the former category, and another 10,000 were expelled.⁶

The purge also enveloped the top leadership hierarchy, meetings of which apparently had been dis-

TABLE I
SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE P.Z.P.R.
(as of September 30, 1971)

Category	Number	Percent
Workers	910,000	40.1
Peasants	250,000	11.0
Intelligentsia	980,000	43.2
including: engineers & technicians	190,000	
teachers	140,000	
economists	120,000	
agricultural & forestry specialists	28,000	
physicians	12,000	
Others	130,000	5.7
Total	2,270,000	100.0

Source: *VI Kongres*, p. 67.

Note: For a comparison with 1968 figures, see *Current History*, April, 1969, p. 220. The party at that time had just over two million members.

continued under the previous administration. The Sixth Congress' proceedings revealed that a few intimate friends of Gomulka arrived at important decisions, not the Political Bureau as a whole. The Central Committee convened only six times during the two years of 1969 and 1970 to rubberstamp these decisions. This body was criticized for not having prevented autocratic rule and for "violation of Leninist work principles within directing party echelons."⁷ However, during the 1970 political crisis the Central Committee allegedly overcame these weaknesses when it elected Gierek as party leader.

NEW LEADERSHIP STYLE

As a result of personnel changes⁸ that followed, the 20 individuals who comprise the current leadership elite differ markedly from their counterparts in other

East European states. The majority never had any Soviet training or experience in the anti-German underground during World War Two. Few were incarcerated by either the prewar or postwar governments in Poland. However, probably none remain unaffected by memories of the October, 1956, or December, 1970, upheavals, both of which led to major changes in the top leadership.

In contrast to his predecessors, Edward Gierek travels extensively throughout Poland. During his first year in office, he visited all 17 provinces.⁹ Other members of the Politburo and/or Secretariat frequently appear outside the capital city. However, despite the promise to divorce party from government, 9 of the 11 Politburo members also hold important government positions; in effect this makes for an interlocking directorate. (See Table II.)

Both the Political Bureau, responsible for policy decisions, and the Secretariat which oversees their implementation meet on a regular basis. The media often report¹⁰ briefly on these sessions, if only to list the topics under discussion. Television programs in which party officials are invited and questioned are another innovation. If nothing else, the man in the street may now believe that he is being informed to some extent about the rationale behind policy decisions.

The new political style has as its objectives restoring party authority and gaining the confidence of a population that has been traditionally anti-Communist. Some observers saw a certain degree of success for this approach in the outcome of national elections to the unicameral Parliament. Since they were held on March 19, 1972, the voters have experienced more than 14 months under the new leadership.

The electoral campaign was utilized to publicize government/party policies through the device of mass rallies, which took place in all parts of the country. A major preelection speech was given by Edward Gierek on March 16, 1972, over television. The comparison with a similar situation, soon after Gomulka assumed power, was striking. Both appealed to the patriotic emotions of Poles and for approval of the "common" program. Although he did not admit this openly, Gierek may have been worried about the attitude of the Soviet Union in case of a small voter turnout. Gomulka had warned¹¹ in his preelection speech on January 19, 1957, that deleting names of Communist party candidates from ballots would mean elimination of Poland from the map of Europe.

The population responded in 1972, as it had done previously. A total of 97.94 per cent of the eligible voters cast their votes and 99.53 per cent of the valid votes supported the single list of National Unity Front candidates. Party leader Gierek received 99.8

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁸ For a comparison with the previous leadership, see Table II in *Current History*, April, 1969, p. 223. Only six of the 18 top leaders from that year remain among the 1973 power elite.

⁹ For example, recently Gierek inspected the Legnica-Głogów copper basin in the company of national party secretary Jan Szydlak. Warsaw Radio, January 18, 1973.

¹⁰ Warsaw Radio, January 23, 1973, announced that the Politburo had approved the production of new tractors, defined tasks of P.Z.P.R. organizations, and heard a report by Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz on his recent visit to India.

¹¹ See my *Poland, 1944-1962* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), Chapter 4, "Electoral Procedures," p. 60.

TABLE II
POWER ELITE IN POLAND, 1973

Politburo and Secretariat	Date of Birth	Government Office	Joined Party	Party Office and/or Area of Responsibility
POLITBURO MEMBERS (11)				
Babiuch, Edward	1927	State Council member	1948	Secretary (cadres); Parliament
Gierek, Edward	1913	—	1931	First Secretary (leader)
Jabłoński, Henryk*	1909	State Council chairman	1948	—
Jagielski, Mieczysław*	1924	Deputy Premier	1945	economic planning
Jaroszewicz, Piotr	1909	Premier	1944	—
Jaruzelski, Wojciech*	1923	Defense Minister	1947	—
Kruczek, Władysław	1910	State Council dpty. chmn.	1932	Trade Union Council chairman
Olszowski, Stefan	1931	Foreign Minister	1952	—
Szlachcic, Franciszek*	1920	State Council member	1943	Secretary (party intl. rel.)
Szydłak, Jan	1925	—	1945	Secretary (prop. & ideology)
Tejchma, Józef	1927	Deputy Premier	1952	agriculture & youth
POLITBURO CANDIDATES (4)				
Barcikowski, Kazimierz*	1927	—	ca. 1948	Secretary (agriculture)
Grudzień, Zdzisław	1924	—	1946	First Secretary, Katowice prov.
Kania, Stanisław	1927	—	1945	Secretary (military & security)
Kępa, Józef*	1928	—	1948	First Secretary, Warsaw-city
SECRETARIES (8, with 6 above)				
Kowalczyk, Stanisław	1924	—	1948	heavy industry & transport
Lukaszewicz, Jerzy	1931	—	ca. 1949	mass media & youth
SECRETARIAT MEMBERS (3)				
Frelek, Ryszard	1929	—	1953	foreign affairs
Werblan, Andrzej	1924	Dpty Sejm speaker	1948	Editor, <i>Nowe drogi</i>
Żandarowski, Zdzisław	1929	—	1948	Dir., Org. Dept.

Sources: VI Zjazd, pp. 311–312; Radio Free Europe, *Poland's Communist Leaders* (Munich, June 1972), pp. 83, biographic data; current identifications from Polish press.

NOTES: * Promoted at Sixth Congress from Secretariat or candidate Politburo status. Italics denote newcomers.

per cent of the ballots in his electoral district. However, dissatisfaction with certain top leaders was shown, when three (Edward Babiuch, Władysław Kruczek, Franciszek Szlachcic) of the 11 Politburo members ended up at the bottom of their respective lists. Five of the national secretaries also came in last, and four others next to last.¹²

Among the 460 Sejm (Parliament) deputies, newly elected from among 625 candidates, almost two-thirds are serving for the first time. Known supporters of Gomulka completely disappeared from the national legislature by the simple device of not having been nominated. Although the lists of names had been arranged in a specific order of preference (those appearing higher being more important), the voters made changes in all 80 constituencies. The top name retained its dominant position in only 7 of these; in 34, the leading candidate ended up last (7 of the lists were turned completely upside down), while the remaining 39 top names dropped, although not to the bottom of the list.¹³

Overall results, in terms of party affiliation, re-

mained unchanged. (See Table III.) The foregoing would seem to suggest that the 1972 elections in Poland neither offered any meaningful choice nor represented a valid measure of discontent. They were used merely as a referendum to claim a popular mandate for the new leadership and to pave the way for the reorganization of the government, which took place nine days after the election.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

After a speech opening the inaugural session of Parliament,¹⁴ party leader Gierek sat back to observe the Sejm elect a new Council of State which serves as collective presidency. His personal candidate for Chairman (replacing Józef Cyrankiewicz), former education minister Professor Henryk Jabłoński, received unanimous endorsement. Piotr Jaroszewicz was reelected Premier, and the following day he proposed his new government.¹⁵ The most important change involved appointment of Józef Tejchma as a Deputy Premier, i.e., a transfer from his previous post as national party secretary in charge of agriculture. The only other new Deputy Premier is Kazimierz Olszewski, promoted from his post as minister of foreign trade.

More significant were changes in the 17-member Council of State, under its new chairman. The

¹² Warsaw Radio, March 20, 1972; and *The New York Times*, March 22, 1972.

¹³ See K. Zamorski and M. Costello, "The Sejm Elections," *RFE Research* (March 24, 1972), pp. 6 and 9, for names.

¹⁴ Warsaw Radio, March 28, 1972.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, March 29, 1972, broadcast the names.

seven new appointees include former Deputy Premier Wincenty Kraśko and two Politburo members who are also national party secretaries: Babiuch and Szlachcic.¹⁶ The newcomers are younger in age than their predecessors, appointed by the Gomułka administration to what in the past had been largely honorific posts.

ECONOMIC POLICY

Implementation of new policies by the Warsaw government can most clearly be seen in agriculture. Meat prices paid to farmers were increased on four occasions between December, 1970, and April, 1972. Despite a growing profit to the producer, retail prices have remained frozen since December, 1970. Perhaps an even greater stimulus to animal husbandry has come from the elimination of compulsory deliveries for which the regime had established artificially low rates. Tax reform now includes less discrimination against the private entrepreneur, who can pay 60 per cent of what he owes the state during the last quarter of the year.¹⁷

Although the party is committed to strengthening state farms and collectivized ones, to the extent of subsidizing investments in both types of socialized agriculture, Gierek's pragmatism appears to have prevailed for the time being at least. On the other hand, the forced expropriation of private farms still remains law in cases where a peasant does not produce one-third of the harvest average for a particular village.¹⁸

Despite these several measures introduced for agriculture, the comprehensive five-year plan (1971–1975) covering the entire economy was not adopted by Parliament until June, 1972, i.e., more than 17 months after it had gone into effect. The first draft of this document was prepared by the Gomułka regime, and the Gierek administration revised it. Major targets received approval at the party's Sixth Congress. After the national elections, a new Parliament discussed the plan and formally voted it into law.¹⁹

¹⁶ The new Council of State membership is listed in RFE, "Communist Party-Government Line-up" (January 25, 1973), p. 18.

¹⁷ Antoni Marek, "Important Changes in Agricultural Policy," *RFE Research* (May 12, 1972), pp. 9–13.

¹⁸ Warsaw Radio, June 6, 1972. According to M. Mieszcankowski, "The Socialist Transformation of Polish Agriculture," *Życie gospodarcze* [Economic Life], October 29, 1972, conditions will not be ripe for complete collectivization until the mid-1980's.

¹⁹ *Dziennik ustaw* [Journal of Laws], no. 22 (June 14, 1972).

²⁰ The difference had been 22.4 per cent during the 1961–1965 planning period, according to *Życie gospodarcze*, June 18, 1972; cited by Antoni Marek, "Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan for 1971–1975," *RFE Research* (August 9, 1972), p. 5.

²¹ Private-entrepreneur farms produced 87.5 per cent of the agricultural output on 16.3 million hectares (83.4 per cent of all cultivated land), according to *Życie gospodarcze*, August 20, 1972.

²² Warsaw Radio, January 8, 1973.

TABLE III
RESULTS OF SEJM ELECTIONS
March 19, 1972

Party	Seats	Percent
Polish United Workers' Party	255	55.5
United Peasant Party	117	25.4
Democratic Party	39	8.5
Non-party	49	10.6
including:		
Catholic groups:		
Znak—5		
Pax—5		
Christian Social Assoc.—2		
Caritas—1		
Total	460	100.0

Source: *Trybuna ludu* [People's Tribune], March 21, 1972. Notes: Among the 460 deputies, there are 90 workers, 22 engineers and technicians, 62 farmers, 16 agricultural experts, 16 teachers and 31 scientific workers. *Ibid.*, March 29, 1972.

Investments are to be increased by some 45 per cent above the previous five-year period, much of this earmarked for social services. Thus, only 2.8 per cent more will be devoted to the means of production (Group A) than to consumers' goods (Group B).²⁰ Per capita consumption will grow by one-fourth over the five-year period, according to the plan, with average real wages increasing by 18 per cent. Agricultural output should expand more than twice as fast as it did during 1965–1970 for a growth of between 19 and 21 per cent over that achieved during the last year of the previous five-year-plan.²¹

According to official government spokesmen, targets for the years 1971 and 1972 were overfulfilled. At a national conference of party activists working in the economy, Premier Jaroszewicz announced that average real wages had gone up 12 per cent during those two years, or more than over the preceding five years. In 24 months, industrial production had increased 20 per cent, in comparison with 1970, the best growth rate in over a decade. Although exports will grow 13 per cent during 1973, import requirements are rising by 20 per cent each year,²² indicating a constant adverse balance of payments.

DIFFICULT PROBLEMS

Premier Jaroszewicz listed several difficult problems. These include absenteeism (totaling 200,000 persons each day), nonfulfillment of plans, excessive production costs (ten billion zlotys lost annually in wasted raw materials alone), and poor quality of production. Unfinished investment projects at the beginning of 1973 totaled some 390 billion zlotys. The Premier also mentioned an appeal in the form of a letter issued jointly by the party secretariat and the government Presidium, calling for additional output.

It is hoped that this may be attained through the consultation system, introduced by Gierek, and in-

volving discussion of economic proposals at mass meetings within the 100 largest economic enterprises. However, because of this innovation, national labor code ratification had to be postponed by the trade union congress in mid-November, 1972. Workers objected to any limitation or complete ban on labor slowdowns. At the port city of Gdańsk, for example, some 40 dockworkers subsequently demanded a meeting with management to discuss whether new labor-saving machinery would eliminate jobs. When dockers complained about inadequate money on payday, crew leaders obtained more for them. Potatoes were sold in the yards, after a stoppage in loading such cargo on Soviet ships.²³ It will not be possible, of course, to continue such bribery indefinitely.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

As a member in good standing of the bloc, the government of Poland has participated actively in the East European military alliance system as well as in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and has supported all Soviet-initiated policies within the international arena. No indication of differences, if any, with Moscow has been publicized. On the contrary, it would appear that the Kremlin is satisfied with the loyalty of the new team in Warsaw. Thus, on his sixtieth birthday, Edward Gierek received the Order of Lenin²⁴ from the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

Trade with the Soviet Union has been expanding from 5.6 billion rubles in 1961–1965 to 9.3 billion during 1966–1970, and a projected 13.4 billion under the current five-year-plan. Agreements were signed between Poland and the U.S.S.R. on cooperative production of computers and aircraft. Some 180 Soviet and 130 Polish research, planning, and design organizations are working together in science and technology. The same is true of 33 Moscow and 18 Warsaw government agencies. Pulp, metallurgical, asbestos, and nickel-producing enterprises in the U.S.S.R. have been assisted by Poland.²⁵

In its relations with other countries, Warsaw coordinates overall policies with Moscow as well as with bloc regimes. A good example of this occurred at the July 31, 1972, Crimea meeting of leaders from

allied East European states. The official communiqué²⁶ did not appear until a week later. A commentary stated that bloc countries stood ready to normalize relations with the Federal Republic of (West) Germany.

The Crimea meeting apparently cleared the way for an exchange of ambassadors between Bonn and Warsaw, announced on September 14, after two days of talks by Poland's Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski in West Germany.²⁷ A nonaggression treaty between the two states had been signed in December, 1970, and was ratified early in June, 1972. As a result, almost 40,000 ethnic Germans were allowed to leave Poland during the years 1971 and 1972. Others await permission to leave.

Polish workers have been employed in the construction of hotels, recreation centers, chemical plants and mine shafts throughout West Germany.²⁸ In furthering détente, Bonn also agreed to pay the Warsaw government an additional lump sum of \$31 million (100 million marks) as final compensation for Polish victims of pseudomedical experiments in Nazi concentration camps during World War II. Only 1,357 applications out of some 6,000 had been handled previously through the International Red Cross, with total payment of \$12.5 million. The new agreement was signed at Geneva by representatives of the two governments.²⁹

Early during the month of October, party leader Gierek arrived in France which had expelled him in 1934 as an undesirable alien because of strike activities. He signed an economic agreement and received \$300 million in credits toward the purchase of French equipment and industrial goods.³⁰ Most-favored-nation treatment was not extended to Poland, although trade is expected to double from the current \$92 million per annum. A ten-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed.

Another development, which may have been cleared in advance with Moscow, occurred at the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly. Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Stanisław Trepczyński had been elected General Assembly president. In his maiden speech on the opening day, he denounced the United States in the following terms:³¹

(Continued on page 226)

²³ *The New York Times*, January 2, 1973, interview with *Głos wybrzeża* [Voice of the Sea Coast] editor; *ibid.*, December 30, 1972.

²⁴ Moscow Radio, January 5, 1972.

²⁵ D. Klimovich, "Priority Significance," *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya* [Socialist Industry], August 4, 1972, p. 3 (Moscow).

²⁶ *Trybuna ludu* [People's Tribune], August 6, 1972 (Warsaw).

²⁷ *Christian Science Monitor*, September 18, 1972. The ambassadors presented their credentials on November 7 and 8, 1972, respectively.

²⁸ *The New York Times*, July 11, 1972.

²⁹ Warsaw Radio, November 16, 1972.

³⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 10, 1972.

³¹ *Ibid.*, September 22, 1972.

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"Not even Tito can completely reverse 20 years of political, economic and social evolution. A new generation for whom the Partisan epic and ideological passions have little concrete meaning has come of political age."

Whither Yugoslavia?

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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YUGOSLAVIA IS UNDERGOING a far-reaching political crisis, the outcome of which will significantly determine the character of the Yugoslav political system in the decade ahead. The crisis is over internal issues, not foreign policy. At stake is not merely the answer to the question, "After Tito, who?" but "After Tito, what?" In a fundamental sense, Tito is trying to reverse the process (which he instituted more than two decades ago) of diffusing power throughout the system. This calls into new focus the role and composition of the party, the system of workers' self-management, the parameters of the succession crisis, and the relationship between the central government and the six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces (the six republics are Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia; the two provinces, which are part of Serbia, are Kosovo and Vojvodina).

Before turning to the specifics of recent internal developments in Yugoslavia as they relate to the struggle for power, a few words may be appropriate about Yugoslav foreign policy, if only to make it clear that it is not a source of serious disagreement among the top Yugoslav leaders.

CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN POLICY

The developing détente in Europe accords with Yugoslavia's perceived foreign policy needs. Improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and between East and West Europe, allow Belgrade maximum flexibility in trade and commercial matters and keep Soviet military threats minimal. Notwithstanding periodic speeches by Tito about threats to Yugoslavia originating in the West (for example, terrorist attacks and assassinations by emigré Croatian groups based in Austria, West Germany and Sweden), the leadership knows that militarily the danger comes primarily from the U.S.S.R. Yugoslavia supports the convening of a European Security Conference, which would multilateralize the European territorial status quo that was confirmed by

the Soviet-West German Treaty of Friendship of May, 1972. It hopes that the conference will result in a further relaxation between East and West, and in greater autonomy for the East European countries.

With respect to the parallel discussions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Yugoslavs publicly say that they hope both sides will thin out their armed forces in Europe and that eventually all Soviet and American troops will withdraw to their respective territories. However, Yugoslav officials privately admit to anxiety over the possibility that the United States might pull out of Europe completely. That is the last thing they would want, although they do not say so for domestic reasons and for reasons pertaining to their relationship with the Communist bloc and the nonaligned nations. Yugoslavia has much to fear from a Europe in which there is no countervailing superpower to balance the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia remains a key member of the nonaligned grouping—the only European country so honored. Tito was one of the founders of nonalignment, and he has lobbied actively over the years on its behalf. That the first Conference of Nonaligned States was held in Belgrade in September, 1961, was a tribute both to Tito's pioneering rôle in bringing the newly independent nations of the Third World together and to the mediatory function that Yugoslavia could fill between Asia and Africa, at least a decade ago. There have been two other nonaligned conferences: in Cairo in October, 1964, and in Lusaka in September, 1970. The next conference is scheduled for Algiers in October, 1973. Among the topics to be discussed, the proposals to denuclearize the Mediterranean area and to bring about a withdrawal of Soviet and American naval forces from the Mediterranean are of particular interest to Belgrade.

Like a boxer feinting in one direction and then another, Yugoslavia leans toward the East and then to the West, all the while taking care to keep her feet rooted firmly in nonalignment. Especially during a

period of internal political flux, a policy of nonalignment ensures that foreign policy will not become an issue of contention among the various groups vying for power because it provides Yugoslavia with a foreign policy which has the support of the key groups.

Too much should not be read into the dramatic improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations during the past 18 months. True, in late 1972 the Soviet Union extended Yugoslavia loans totalling about one billion dollars for the purchase of Soviet power plants and machinery. Although without question an indication of improving Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the loans do not mean that Yugoslavia intends to rejoin the Soviet bloc or that Moscow will be able to parlay the credits into political influence in Yugoslavia, now or in the post-Tito period. Yugoslavia has accepted Soviet credits in the past without changing her fundamental policies. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs may be expected to be cautious because the Soviet record as a lender is not distinguished: on one occasion the Soviet government peremptorily cancelled a loan; on another occasion, the Yugoslavs found that they were able to utilize only one-third of the total offered because of changes in Yugoslav investment priorities and difficulties in reaching agreement for repayment. It is also true that Moscow has sound economic reasons for extending credits: the Soviet economy can use the raw materials (bauxite, copper, chrome) and finished products (ships and electrical goods) that Yugoslavia will presumably use to repay the credits.

Yugoslavia's overall foreign policy is not apt to change significantly in the foreseeable future. The positions briefly sketched above will most likely continue to define the Yugoslav position. However, the domestic orientation of Yugoslav society is very much at the crossroads.

THE ROOTS OF TITOISM

In 1945, Tito was a most improbable candidate for heresy. Reared in the Byzantine-like crucible of Soviet and international Communist intrigue, he survived Stalin's bloody purges in the 1930's by a combination of guile and luck. When the Germans invaded Yugoslavia in April, 1941, Tito organized a successful guerrilla movement and rose to power after the defeat of the Axis powers. A confirmed Communist and the most Stalinist of all the Communist leaders in East Europe, he modeled Yugoslavia's political system on that of the Soviet Union, and followed the Soviet lead in world affairs. Indeed, his militancy on Trieste and the Greek civil war proved something of an embarrassment to Stalin.

However, Tito was not willing to play puppet to Stalin. Having come to power largely through his own efforts, he refused to turn Yugoslavia into a satellite of the Soviet Union. As a result, on June 28, 1948, Stalin had Tito excommunicated from the in-

ternational Communist movement. He sought either to force Tito to recant or to have him toppled by a cabal of his own associates. The move backfired, and Tito became a symbol for all Yugoslavs of the country's determination to maintain its independence and forge its own road to socialism. Excommunication forced Tito to look for security in new relationships with the non-Communist world, and to revise his assumptions and policies regarding the organization of Yugoslav society.

In 1950, Tito took the first step toward decentralizing the Yugoslav economy. Legislation established the Workers' Council as the key unit responsible for operating all enterprises. Agriculture was effectively decollectivized and returned in the main to private ownership. The system of self-management was intended to give the workers a direct stake in the success of industrial, social, and cultural enterprises, and to stimulate productivity and efficiency. It also served to mobilize the population behind the leadership during the period of maximum peril from the Soviet Union (1950-1953).

This decentralization and de-étatization was carried over to the political realm as well. In November, 1952, at the party's Sixth Congress, the Yugoslav Communist party was renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in order to distinguish the Yugoslav brand of socialism from the Soviet, and to emphasize Tito's goal of disengaging the party from day-to-day control of political and economic life. The Congress established the fact that party officials were no longer to interfere with governmental or economic decision-making; that henceforth the LCY would play a guiding role in the affairs of the country, but not a dominant one; and that greater authority would be given to the republican party organizations. The center would make recommendations, but leave their actual implementation to the constituent republican and provincial party and governmental units. For the first time, a Communist elite in power voluntarily relinquished and redistributed political power. This process continued sporadically, but steadily, throughout the 1950's and 1960's.

In 1965-1966, extensive economic reforms accelerated the devolution of power to the republics. Economic decentralization had the effect of strengthening political pluralism along republican lines and, inevitably, of intensifying nationality rivalry; it also weakened local party organizations, which found themselves bereft of purpose and power to the degree that economic criteria supplanted political loyalty and deference to local party oligarchs as determinants for advancement.

In July, 1966, the downfall of Aleksandar Ranković—the Vice-President, heir-apparent, and long-time head of the secret police—gave added impetus to de-étatization and the diffusion of political power. It

further augmented the power of republican party bosses at the expense of the central government. At the Ninth Congress of the LCY in March, 1969, the republican oligarchs acquired the power to deadlock the decision-making process of the highest party organs. With the emergence of the republics as significant foci of power came a resurgence of nationality sentiment along republican lines. As long as the top party leadership had exercised tight control over the republican party organizations, ethnic particularism had been kept in rein. Decentralization turned up major weaknesses, which crystallized with dramatic suddenness in the Croatian affair of December, 1971.

THE CROATIAN AFFAIR: ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH

In 1970-1971, the country's economic problems took a turn for the worse; galloping inflation, unproductive and excessive capital investments, structural unemployment, a disproportionate concentration of wealth by big business and a few banks, mismanagement and corruption all assumed serious dimensions. The central government was unable or unwilling to take effective measures because the individual republican leaders did not want to relinquish to the center in Belgrade any of the powers they had only recently acquired. Tito, for his part, seemed not to realize the rapidity with which the country was drifting toward an economic crisis, and continued to press decentralization.

The key figure in the Croatian affairs was Miko Tripalo. Born in 1926, he had joined the Communist party in 1943, fought with the Partisans, and risen meteorically in the Croatian Communist party, becoming a member of the Croatian Central Committee in 1962, and subsequently a member of the LCY Presidium (Central Committee) and of the State Presidency of Yugoslavia. By early 1970, Tripalo had established his control over the key organs of the League of Communists of Croatia, defeating and isolating his opponents on the ostensible issue of his defense of Croatia's interests against the "unitarists," i.e., those who favored a greater measure of authority in the central government in Belgrade. Together with Mrs. Savka Dabčević-Gučar, the President of the League of Communists of Croatia, Tripalo manipulated the hitherto dampened fires of ethnic and cultural nationalism to develop a base of popular support. Known as the Croatian "Bonnie and Clyde," the two cut a bold swath in Croatian politics.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1971, Tito established a collective State Presidency of Yugoslavia, based on the principle of equal representation for the six republics and appropriate representation for the two autonomous provinces. By ensuring representation for all the nationality groups and providing that the post

of President of Yugoslavia would rotate annually after his death, Tito hoped to institutionalize an orderly system for sharing power and to allay anxieties among the various republics over fear of domination by Serbia. The State Presidency was also weighted to guarantee that the interests of the republics would not be downgraded in the formulation of national economic policy. Then came the Croatian crisis.

A student strike at the Croatian University in Zagreb was the catalyst. Supporting (among other issues) Tripalo's demands that Croatia be given a greater share of the hard currency earned in the republic, the students paralyzed the university, but failed to enlist the support of the factory workers or the students at the other branches of the university in Zadar, Split and Rijeka. In early December, 1971, ten days after the strike had begun, Tito convened the top LCY leadership and castigated the Croatian leadership, headed by Tripalo, for behaving with a "lack of vigilance, nonchalance, and unhealthy liberalism" toward groups whose ultra-nationalistic and anarchistic behavior threatened to sow serious discord in Croatia and undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav federation. Tripalo and his supporters were forced to resign. He was removed as much for trying to use Croatian nationalism as a lever to extract concessions from Belgrade as for trying to build a political machine outside the framework of the LCY.

The Croatian crisis highlighted the weaknesses of excessive decentralization. It impelled Tito to start a campaign to recentralize the party and to restore it to the authoritative political role which it had played prior to the late 1950's. At his insistence, the Second Conference of the LCY, held in Belgrade from January 25 to 27, 1972, adopted an "Action Program" which called for a strengthening of party ideological and organizational unity. Tito envisaged a process of weeding out opportunists from the party and of restoring it to a leading position in the formulation and administration of policy in all fields of activity. He also called for greater attention to educating the youth in Marxism and took a swipe at intellectuals. In general, Tito sought to recentralize power in the hands of the party; in particular, he wanted to eliminate any opposition to the policies which he believed essential for the country and the party.

The LCY Executive Bureau was reduced from 15 to 8 members, and shaped to Tito's purposes, and not to the wishes of the 52-member Presidium. At a meeting of the Presidium in July, 1972, Tito expressed displeasure with the snail's pace of reforms in republican party organizations, and at the government's ineptness in coping with mounting economic problems.

SERBIA IN FLUX

Tito's "mini-cultural revolution" may be dated from September 18, 1972, when he openly called for

the removal from the party of those who refused to implement his Action Program. Party meetings were convened in all the republics to discuss Tito's latest statement. In a matter of weeks, top leaders in Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia had been purged. Despite Tito's disclaimer that this did not imply a return to Stalinism, the effect of the purges has been to raise questions about the future of market socialism and the movement toward liberalization in Yugoslavia.

Thus far, the most disturbing purges occurred in Serbia. On October 21, 1972, Marko Nikezić was forced to resign as chairman of the Central Committee and Latinka Perović as secretary of the Central Committee. Both had the reputation of being moderate, able, responsible leaders who worked well with other nationality groups and who were highly regarded in Croatia. They were replaced by relative nonentities, devoid of any real power, who might be expected to carry out Tito's every implicit wish. During the next few months, many Serbs associated with the liberal and pro-decentralization wing of the party resigned. Most prominent among them was Koča Popović, long a close associate of Tito's and his chief of staff and foreign minister for many years.

At the heart of the present political crisis in the republican party leadership is the controversy over the role of the party. Tito is determined to remove from positions of authority those who argue that the party should not again seek to exercise political power directly over the industrial, economic, governmental, cultural and educational organizations of self-management. Tito insists that the party must curb the tendency toward republican oligarchies; that republican nationalism must be ruthlessly stamped out. In contrast to Nikezić, he maintains that the party can no longer afford to stand apart from decision-making in key sectors of the economy.

1973 will be a difficult year for Yugoslav workers. Austerity and stabilization are the twin themes of government policy. In 1971 and 1972, almost 1,000 enterprises, employing a total of some 660,000 workers, incurred losses of more than \$300 million. According to the director-general of the government's Social Accounting Service only four per cent of these losses have been covered "in a healthy way"; the remainder will have to be written off or made up by government subsidies. Tito and the men around him stress the necessity for stern measures to put the economy in order, to curb the persisting annual inflation of 17 per cent, and to reduce consumer spending. Higher taxes, "voluntary" pledges of savings from wages, and other austerity measures are being introduced. That the factory workers in the most important electronics plant in Serbia were not paid wages for several months because of inept management was for Tito a sign of the rot that has to be uprooted if Yugoslavia is to progress. Tito's position

is that only the introduction of a strong dose of centralization will reverse the deteriorating economic situation.

One political consequence of the implementation of Tito's Action Program is a major purge of all party organizations. The accusations tend to be similar in all cases. Thus, in mid-January, 1973, at the time of the forced resignations of the top party leaders of Vojvodina, the charges leveled sounded like those made against Nikezić and the deposed Serbian leaders: they had tolerated liberalism, "which led to factionalism"; they had engaged in questionable practices, such as recruitment and promotion based on friendship, allowing bureaucratism to flourish, cultivating a cult of leadership which set the individual above the party, and attempting to monopolize the public media to promote their own ideas and interests.

A new party program is due to be drafted and discussed in the spring of 1973. It will not only establish the party's position on all major issues, but will also serve as an instrument for fashioning intra-party discipline and purging opponents of Tito's new orthodoxy. Throughout 1973, congresses of the League of Communists will be convened in the republics and provinces to discuss the draft program and elect new slates of officials. Congresses of "the trade unions, veterans' organizations, youth and other sociopolitical and social organizations" will also be held. More than 40 such political gatherings are scheduled for the next 6 to 12 months.

All of this is by way of preparation for the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which will be convened in 1974. Presumably, the congress will elect a leadership satisfactory to Tito and positioned to carry out his design for Yugoslavia during the years immediately ahead. This appears to be the scenario for 1973 and 1974, but uncertainties exist and could greatly alter the outcome: Tito's health and the extent to which personal pique shapes his political behavior; the effectiveness of recentralization in solving intractable economic problems; the ability of the self-management system to function more efficiently without sacrificing the ethos of workers' participation; the nation's response to Tito's call for austerity and a renewed commitment to the ideals implicit in socialism; the fate of the constitutional amendments, whose meaning and implementation are still not clear; the quality of the party members who are being thrust into positions of responsibility; and the international economic position of Yugoslavia.

CRACKDOWN ON THE INTELLECTUALS

One of the more disturbing features of the current political scene is Tito's consistently bitter attack against intellectuals engaged in the study of Marxism. In speech after speech, Tito deplores the diminution in attention devoted to the classics of Marxism and de-

mands that the universities rectify this situation. For example, on September 10, 1972, in a major speech marking the anniversary of the battle of Kozara in Bosnia, Tito said it was "a shame that Marxism was taught only two hours a week at our universities. We must give a Marxist education to our youth not only at the universities but also in secondary schools and so forth." He was adamant:

We have expelled Marxism, we have expelled Marx and Engels and Lenin from our schools. Let us bring them back! No autonomy of any kind of the university can prevent us from doing this. . . .

Tito has also demanded the expulsion of "politically negative elements" from university faculties.

Why this hostility toward a handful of university professors? None of them stands accused of the main shortcomings identified by Tito as being at the heart of Yugoslavia's political-economic crisis today: the need for tighter discipline in the League of Communists; the revitalization of the self-management system; the extirpation of corruption from the party and society; an end to speculation in real estate; and the punishment of those who have acquired wealth illegally.

THE STUDENT RIOTS

Explanations for Tito's attitude must remain highly speculative until more evidence is available, but a few comments are in order. First, Tito has been hostile to the independent-minded university professors ever since the student riots of June, 1968. The crisis had its roots in a student fracas over a folk festival. Several thousand members of the Communist Youth Organization were brought to Belgrade from rural areas to attend a pop concert as a reward for good work. The show was scheduled in an outdoor arena near the main dormitories of Belgrade University. When several hundred university students tried to crash the concert without tickets, scuffles broke out between the two youth groups. The police were called in to curb the disturbances.

This had the effect of polarizing the situation into a student versus police confrontation. Some radical students from the university seized the opportunity to formulate a series of "demands," which called for changes not merely in the university but in the society at large as well, and for a more vigorous condemnation by the government of American "aggression" in Vietnam. Overnight, slogans such as "Down with the Red Bourgeoisie" appeared, calling attention to the growing disparity between the wealthy and the poor and the phenomenon of party officials enriching themselves. Tito intervened, mollified the students by promising to push for the implementation of more egalitarian policies and practices, and settled the strike by peaceful means. He emerged from the inci-

dent with enhanced prestige (while in a comparable situation in France, President Charles de Gaulle was dethroned). However, his hostility to the university professors who sided with the students dates from that period, even though he subsequently incorporated many of their demands in his 1972 proposals for revitalizing the party.

Tito apparently blamed the faculty for the student riots and tried to have some prominent faculty members dismissed. However, the situation was more complicated than Tito acknowledged, and the faculties refused to be stampeded into firing their colleagues, many of whom had played a stabilizing role, and not an inflammatory one, in the events of June, 1968.

Second, Tito has never been comfortable with revisionists of Marxism who went beyond his own beliefs. A life-long Communist, now 81 years old, Tito may be overreacting to the threats he perceives in the interpretations of Marxism espoused by a number of intellectuals under attack. Tito may want to cow them into silence to enhance the status of those who will teach and advocate his brand of Marxist orthodoxy.

Third, Tito blames the "anarcho-liberal" professors for the ideological backsliding of the youth. He has ordered the party to carry out an extensive campaign of ideological reeducation. In December, 1972, the Third Conference of the LCY dealt primarily with this problem. It called for improvements in the teaching of Marxism and, concomitantly, for exposure of the "anti-Marxian and unsocialistic ideologies" which "have aimed especially at influencing the younger generation." It set forth a detailed program for intensifying ideological instruction among young people, in schools, in sports organizations and in work camps. Attention was also called to the need to counter the increasingly active proselytizing of various religious denominations.

The heavy criticisms of several dozen writers, journalists, and university professors, though they may provide a clue to Tito's aims, will not remedy the ills that ail Yugoslavia. It is not yet clear how hard Tito intends to press to get his way.

OBSERVATIONS

Dissatisfaction with the economic, political, cultural
(Continued on page 228)

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, one of *Current History's* contributing editors, is author of a number of books, including *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 3d edition (New York: Random House, 1972), and *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), and is coeditor of *Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations* (New York: New York University Press, 1971).

"... there appears now some hope that with the political trials of the summer of 1972 the repression spiral may have reached its limit," notes this specialist, who points out that "the signs of change have so far been only slight, but they are there."

Czechoslovakia's Abnormal "Normalization"

BY EDWARD TABORSKY

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THE ENTHUSIASM AND exhilarating expectations of the period January to August, 1968, are gone, leaving Czechoslovak citizens with only the faint hope that the quality of life will not in the near future revert to that of the drab, fearful years under Antonín Novotný, who was removed as Czechoslovakia's President and party boss by the reformers in early 1968."

So wrote Professor Alvin Rubinstein in his article, "Czechoslovakia in Transition" (published in *Current History* in April, 1969), seven months after the armies of the Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact partners invaded the country to put a forcible halt to Czechoslovakia's exciting experiment with "socialism with a human face." Unfortunately, even that faint hope seemed to have all but vanished in the last four years; save for a slight improvement in material living standards, the quality of life in post-1968 Czechoslovakia has deteriorated to its pre-1968 level and in some aspects—such as thought control, police repression and subservience to Moscow—to the even more degrading levels of the middle and late 1950's.

However, toward the end of 1972 and in the first months of 1973, there was a slight improvement in the regime's behavior. Having reestablished orthodox party controls over all aspects of public life and having earned the all-important Soviet approval for having done so, Gustav Husák (who succeeded the reformist leader, Alexandr Dubček, as top party boss in April, 1969) and some of his associates obviously began to feel that the time had come to move gradually toward a measure of moderation.

The cardinal criticism of the "Czechoslovak spring of 1968" was that the Czechoslovak Communist party

(KSC) had fallen under the control of revisionists and "right-wing opportunists" and was being evicted from its position of leadership. Thus the Soviet-prescribed "normalization" aimed at a prompt correction of this intolerable state of affairs. Indeed, the arrest and humiliating treatment of the three top Czechoslovak Communist leaders—Alexandr Dubček, Josef Smrkovsky and Oldrich Cerník—in the first hours of the invasion by Soviet military police reveal that the Kremlin originally expected a new orthodox and pro-Soviet leadership to be installed then and there.¹ What the Soviet leaders could not accomplish in August, 1968, they managed to pull off seven months later, in April, 1969. Using the anti-Soviet demonstrations that broke out in March, 1969, in Prague (after the Czechoslovak team defeated the Russians in the world ice hockey championship) as a convenient pretext, the Soviet Politbureau forced Dubček's resignation. The far more pliable and "realistic" Gustav Husák replaced him. What followed was a quick succession of purges which removed all those involved in the 1968 reform movement from their party functions. Pro-Soviet hardliners replaced them.²

The next logical step was, of course, to "purify" the party's rank and file. As the new party leadership well knew, most of the ordinary party members had succumbed to "revisionist illusions" in 1968. Hence, in 1970, a complete exchange of party membership cards was ordered so that all undesirable elements could be weeded out of the party. Directives to that effect, spelled out in an open letter from the party's Central Committee published in *Rudé právo*, the party's main daily, allowed those involved in the 1968 reform movement to retain party membership only if they publicly confessed their mistakes, "renounced their political past" and pledged to support the party without reservation in the future.³

¹ See more about this in Edward Taborsky, "Czechoslovakia: The Return to 'Normalcy,'" *Problems of Communism*, XIX, 6 (1970), pp. 31 ff.

² Details in Taborsky, *op. cit.*, in note 1.

³ *Rudé právo*, February 3, 1970.

Although the removal of undesirables was to have been completed in the first half of 1970, it dragged on virtually until the year's end, suggesting that the "purification" was encountering difficulties. Evidently, a great many of the screening committees set up in the primary party organizations worked rather slowly and hesitantly, because many of the screeners were themselves reformists in disguise. A number of the screening committees even had to be disbanded for being too lenient in judging their fellow party members.⁴ Moreover, the purge reduced the party membership only by some 20 per cent, from 1,671,000 (as of January 1, 1969) to about 1,200,000, which was a considerably smaller decrease than the party leaders (and, in particular, their Soviet mentors) were aiming at.⁵

THE COMPLETION OF "NORMALIZATION"

Husák and his associates substituted orthodox hardliners and pliable sycophants for the deposed reformists throughout the party apparatus and "purified" the party's rank and file. In May, 1971, finally, they felt that it was safe to convene the long-delayed Fourteenth Communist Party Congress. Designed to serve as the concluding act in the process of the party's "normalization," the Congress looked and sounded like a replay from the neo-Stalinist 1950's. Events were carefully stage-managed, and the hallmarks of the proceeding were prostration vis-à-vis Moscow, repetitive attacks on revisionism and "right-wing opportunism," and unanimity in voting for whatever the party leaders chose to propose. Husák was reelected as Secretary General (a change of title from First Secretary, to match the post-Khrushchev Soviet terminology). So was the 11-man Presidium of the Central Committee (from which all the reformers had already been removed), save for the replacement of Evzen Erban, a repentant one-time reformer, by the ultra-conservative Karel Hoffman, the boss of the trade unions. But only 26 of the members of the Central Committee elected by the previous thirteenth congress were found worthy to be included in the new 115-man Central Committee.

⁴ See Taborsky, *op. cit.*, in note 1.

⁵ As announced by Husák in December, 1970, 326,817 members did not receive new membership cards; an additional 146,914 left the party on their own in 1968-1969. *Rudé právo*, December 15, 1970, reported that 437,731 members were eliminated by the 1970 exchange of membership cards.

⁶ Data on the membership and the problems related to it are taken from various Czechoslovak periodicals, such as *Rudé právo*, and *Zivot strany*.

⁷ "About 25,000" persons admitted as candidates for party membership in 1971 were said to be workers and 85 per cent of them were under the age of 35. *Zivot strany*, No. 3, February 7, 1972, and *Rudé právo*, May 18, 1972. But it is estimated that each year at least 5,000 workers from among party members are given managerial, technical, clerical and party assignments, and thus cease to be actual workers at the bench.

Changes in the party rules also testified to the KSC's deference to the Soviet model. Copying the amendments made earlier in Soviet Communist party rules, the new Czechoslovak party rules provided that the congresses of the Czechoslovak and Slovak Communist parties would meet every five years instead of four, and that regional and district party conferences would meet every two to three years. The rules also restored the previously abolished candidature, the probationary period preceding the granting of full party membership, which was set for a two-year period.

Thus the "normalization" of the once so recalcitrant Communist party of Czechoslovakia was at last completed to Soviet satisfaction, and the Kremlin was so pleased that Husák received a second Order of Lenin for his contribution thereto. But weighty problems and "negative tendencies" persist. One major concern that continues to plague party leaders is the imbalance in the social and age structure of the party's rank and file. Between 1952 and the completion of the membership-card exchange by the end of 1970, the ratio of blue-collar workers in party membership plummeted from 42.6 per cent to 26.1 per cent. As a result, the ranks of the KSC are replete with white-collar workers and other segments of the intelligentsia; and, as revealed by *Zivot strany*, the fortnightly of the Central Committee, 25 per cent of all graduate engineers, technicians and economists are party members.⁶ On the other hand, the median age of party members rose to 49 and close to one-fourth of the 1,200,000 members are old-age pensioners. In view of the well-known Communist obsession with the working-class base of the party and the paramount importance attached to the party's appeal to youth, the leaders' concern can be easily understood. But their strenuous efforts to remedy the situation have so far brought only meager results.⁷

Nor did Husák and his confreres have better luck in their endeavors to resolve yet another stubborn dilemma, namely, the apathy of the overwhelming majority of party members. This is, of course, hardly surprising. The 1970 purge was supposed to retain within the party only "healthy forces" committed to pro-Sovietism and doctrinal orthodoxy. Yet there is no doubt that in the newly "purified" party there are a very substantial number of revisionists who pose successfully as orthodox Marxists-Leninists or penitent ex-reformers. Most of these crypto-revisionists (plus untold numbers who joined the party for opportunistic reasons) cling to their membership only to protect their jobs, the material advantages that go with them, their children's chances for higher schooling, and other such benefits reserved primarily for party members in good standing. They are prepared to fulfill their membership duties only to the extent necessary for this purpose. Moreover, after

what happened to party zealots following the downfall of Novotný and his clique in 1968, not many party members (especially the younger ones) are eager to make themselves despised by active implementation of the heartily disliked policies of the post-Dubček party leadership.

PARTY DIFFERENCES

Before dropping the subject of the KSC, we must mention the potentially significant differences of opinion within the party leadership as to what ought to be done about the tens of thousands of capable and knowledgeable individuals (party members, ex-party members and non-members) mainly in the ranks of the intelligentsia, who had actively supported the reform movement but had not belonged to its leadership. These differences have been rumored time and again. But it was only in November, 1972, that their existence was confirmed by one of the top leaders of the KSC, namely, Vasil Bílák, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Ideological Commission. Addressing the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist party on November 9, 1972, Bílák had sharp words of rebuke for unnamed proponents of the "blue-sky theory," who presumably felt that the dark clouds of the right-wing menace had been chased away and that, therefore, it was "high time for liberalization to set in."⁸ This would be tantamount, cautioned Bílák, to "providing fertile ground for anti-socialist views and theories . . . which weaken socialism and our alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union." Bílák is considered to be the most pro-Soviet and most orthodox among the present hierarchs of the Czechoslovak Communist party.

Bílák was guilty of exaggeration, of course, in using the term "liberalization" to describe the goal of the alleged adherents of the "blue-sky theory." It would have been more accurate to refer to them as moderates, pragmatists, or perhaps "realists." What these "realists" want is evidently to end the continuous witchhunt, to tone down the excessive preoccupation with doctrinal purity and, above all, to reenlist into productive work those who had erred in 1968, so that their skills could be put to use for the good of the entire society.

Although Bílák named no names, there is no doubt that the leader of the pragmatists is no less a person than the party's Secretary General himself. The vicissitudes of his long political career make it clear that Husák is tough, ruthless and extremely am-

bitious. This is corroborated by those who know or knew him personally (the author of this article being one of them). To fulfill his personal ambition, Husák would do almost anything. Nonetheless he has tried to choose the best or at least the least harmful alternative for the nation. Forced to abide by the fiat of the Soviet Politbureau and to watch his step very carefully in view of the ever-present danger posed by inveterate hardliners (such as his fellow Presidium members Bílák, Indra, Kapek and Hoffman), Husák has had little room for independent action. Indeed, his predicament is reminiscent of that of Emil Hácha, the hapless President of post-Munich Czechoslovakia and Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia in 1938-1940. Yet, in the opinion of this writer, Husák can be expected to strive for as much moderation as the limitations imposed upon him permit.

CLEANING THE TRANSMISSION BELTS

Alongside the "purification" of the Communist party, a thorough top-to-bottom cleansing was undertaken in all state and other institutions, organizations and associations. As the Kremlin saw it, most of them had been virtually taken over in 1968 by the forces of revisionism, right-wing opportunism and anti-Sovietism. Thus they had to be returned to their proper role as dependable transmission belts for party decisions. Once pro-Soviet hardliners were reestablished in the highest party organs, the orthodox ax began to fall with ever increasing vehemence upon the heads of officials and functionaries who had been actively involved in the reform movement.

By November, 1971, Husák's regime felt safe enough to allow general elections (already three years overdue) to be held for the Federal Assembly, the Czech and Slovak National Councils, and the people's committees, the organs of local government on all levels. The real purpose of the elections was accurately pinpointed in the title of an article in *Zivot strany* explaining the party's decision to hold the elections: "The Meaning of the Elections—To Strengthen Socialist Power."⁹

The Communist-controlled National Front retained the exclusive right to approve or disapprove any suggested candidate. Thus there was no risk that any opponent of the regime might be placed on the ballot. Even so, massive police measures were taken to nip any signs of protest in the bud. Indeed, the few daring reformers who did try to distribute leaflets reminding people of their constitutional right not to vote were arrested and were subsequently sent to prison. Moreover, the regime's agitators made it clear that failure to vote was tantamount to an act of disloyalty that might have serious consequences. It is not too surprising that the electoral statistics read like a carbon copy of "elections" held in the darkest

⁸ For an analysis of Bílák's speech see the Radio Free Europe report *Czechoslovakia*/23, November 16, 1972.

⁹ No 15, July 26, 1971. See also, "What Kind of Elections It Will Be?" *Nedelná Pravda*, No. 31, August 6, 1971.

days of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism: 99.45 per cent of the registered voters were said to have participated in the balloting and 99.77–99.85 per cent of them were recorded as having voted for the unopposed, regime-chosen candidates.

The weeding-out process was fairly easy in the various branches of the government establishment and in the “non-Communist” parties that had been allowed to vegetate in Czechoslovakia after the Communist coup of 1948. But the weeding-out process was complicated and lengthy in the case of youth and student organizations and with regard to a number of semi-autonomous cultural and professional associations, like the Unions of Dramatic, Graphic and Plastic Artists, Composers, Journalists, Architects and above all, the Union of Czechoslovak Writers. So stubborn was the resistance which party “normalizers” encountered in these associations that they had no choice but to liquidate them altogether. New organizations were established instead, headed and staffed by whatever collaborators they could find. The process was consummated in 1972—dubbed by Communist writers as the “Year of Congresses”—when more than a dozen of the “purified” associations held their respective congresses to formalize their lowly status, to “elect” the new leaders imposed on them by the regime, and to condemn with self-critical indignation the unholy activities of their predecessors.

THE REPRESSION SPIRAL

The massive purge that proved to be necessary to accomplish the kind of “normalization” demanded by the Soviet leaders was bound to lead to all sorts of punitive and repressive measures. The regime had to make sure that the fallen reformers would not rise again and that those who had saved themselves by timely and sufficiently repentant self-criticism would remain frightened enough not to succumb to any sinful relapses. Moreover (as is always the case in such situations), sheer personal vendetta also took its toll.

Most affected by repression have been the communications media, culture and education. Those who had been actively involved in the 1968 experiment with “socialism with a human face” were ejected from their positions in radio broadcasting, television, film ateliers and theaters, on editorial boards of newspapers, in magazines and publishing houses, research institutes, universities and even lower

educational institutions. They were also humiliated by being assigned to the most menial and lowest paid jobs. Their works—books, articles, plays, films—could not be published or shown, even when they were strictly non-political. “They throw themselves on a man like a wild pack of dogs,” complained Ludvík Vaculík, the prominent Czech writer and author of the famed 1968 liberal manifesto *Two Thousand Words*, in a recent interview with the West German paper *Die Zeit*.¹⁰

Although Husák’s regime has repeatedly declared that there will be no political trials and that no one will be prosecuted for his actions or attitudes in 1968, a substantial proportion of the many thousands who were taken into custody or were subjected to recurrent police investigations at one time or another since Husák’s assumption of leadership in April, 1969, have been arrested and harassed—and a number of them have been tried and sentenced—solely or primarily because of their association with the 1968 reform movement and their expression of continued belief in its cause. The most conspicuous example of this was a series of political trials staged during the summer of 1972 in which almost 50 persons (most of them active participants in the 1968 reform movement) were sentenced to prison terms ranging from nine months to six and one-half years for little more than disapproving the Soviet-style “elections” of 1971.

However, there appears now some hope that with the political trials of the summer of 1972 the repression spiral may have reached its limit. The Husák-led group of pragmatists within the party leadership (which has been trying for some time, however cautiously and hesitantly, to contain the hardliners’ extremism) seems recently to have gained more leverage. The position of the moderates has been strengthened by such developments as the winding-up of the Vietnamese war; the Soviet-American rapprochement and the Soviet Union’s desire for a sort of European détente; the improvement in the relations between West Germany, East Germany and Poland; the harsh condemnation of the 1972 Czech trials not only by Western “bourgeois” circles but also by West European Communists; and the need to attain the best possible results in Czechoslovakia’s fifth five-year plan, a need that could hardly be served by continued witchhunting.

SIGNS OF CHANGE

The signs of change have so far been only slight, but they are there. Recent reports from Prague filed by Western correspondents speak of a lightening in the overall atmosphere, conciliatory gestures on the part of party officials, a growing desire to improve Czechoslovakia’s image and her relations with the West. Their reports indicate that even some of the reformers are now willing to give Husák a measure of credit

¹⁰ *Die Zeit*, January 12, 1973. Vaculík’s reference was to a prominent Czech writer who was not even allowed to hold the job of an ordinary proofreader in a Prague publishing house. In the same interview, Vaculík cites also the case of the well-known Czech writer, Ivan Klíma, who was barred from publishing even his book of fairy tales for children, and Jiri Sotola, another prominent Czech novelist, whose historical novel was turned down although it had nothing to do with the present.

for at least trying to moderate the situation within the scant room for maneuver he has left.¹¹ Similarly, a major address delivered by Husák on November 29, 1972, during his tour of Northern Bohemia and broadcast nation-wide contained none of the usual rhetoric against "the remnants of right-wing opportunists," and its overall tone was one of reconciliation and concentration on economic reconstruction rather than on ideological struggle.¹²

There were other signs pointing in the same direction. In December, 1972, one of the liberals, Jiří Lederer, who had been sentenced to a two-year prison term in February, 1972, was released from prison. And Ludek Pachman, the noted Czech chess grandmaster and a prominent figure of the reform movement, who had spent some time in jail for his continued criticism of the post-Dubček regime, was allowed to go into exile in the West (even though Pachman's property remained confiscated and he had to pay an exorbitant sum for his exit permit).

AIMING AT THE HEART THROUGH THE STOMACH

One political reason for Husák's emphasis on the economy is his desire to gain popular support and to strengthen his position by raising the standard of living. Having found it impossible to convince the Czechoslovak man in the street that the return to pre-1968 "normalcy" was better for him than Dubček's "socialism with a human face," the party's Secretary General evidently expects that a typical Czech or Slovak will eventually become reconciled to his fate if it is sweetened by better food and other material goodies.

Official statistics (which are sometimes misleading in this respect) and observations made by recent visitors to Czechoslovakia indicate that living standards have indeed been on the rise in the last two years. The improvement is neither spectacular nor unexpected. After the nearly catastrophic disarray caused by the hectic events of 1968, by the abortive transition to a new economic model and, above all, by the Soviet invasion and occupation, there was bound to be some improvement in Czech economic performance. Both reports of Western correspondents and information supplied by some of the ousted reformers tend to confirm the fact that improved living standards, coupled with the lessening of repression, make the situation more bearable for a growing number of people. "Who does not miss freedom of speech has no reason for underground activity," said Vaculík in his above-mentioned interview in *Die Zeit*.

¹¹ See, for instance, Eric Bourne's report distributed in January, 1973, by the *Christian Science Monitor Service*—c-73.

¹² For an analysis of the speech see the Radio Free Europe report *Czechoslovakia/25*, December 5, 1972.

THE ECONOMY

The eventual outcome of Husák's endeavors to gain popular support by making life materially better for the average man depends, of course, very much on the results of Czechoslovakia's fifth five-year plan, begun in 1971. The plan's directives call for the following increases in the 1971-1975 quinquennium: national income by 28 per cent (of which at least 95 per cent should result from increased labor productivity), industrial production by 34-36 per cent, labor productivity in industry by 30-32 per cent, agricultural production by 14 per cent, capital investments by 35-37 per cent, foreign trade by 36-38 per cent and retail trade by 28-30 per cent. The results obtained in the plan's first two years appear in Table I.

TABLE I: RESULTS OF THE FIFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

(Percentile Increases Over the Preceding Year)

	1971	1972
National income	5.3	5.8
Industrial production	6.9	6.4
consumer goods	5.9	5.5
producer goods	7.4	6.9
Agricultural production	2.8	3.6
Labor productivity in	6.5	6.1 (in Czech lands)
industry		5.0 (in Slovakia)
Monetary income	5.5	5.8
Real wages	4.1	4.4
Personal consumption	5.8	5.5
Retail trade	5.2	5.5

Source: Announcements of the Czechoslovak Federal Statistical Office for 1971 and 1972.

Czechoslovakia's economy apparently did fairly well during the first two years of the plan. Nevertheless, judging by never-ceasing Communist complaints and admonitions, the country's "normalized" economy of the early 1970's continues to encounter much the same problems that have plagued it since the Communist takeover in 1948. Although absenteeism from work decreased somewhat from its peak of 5.1 per cent in 1970, 4.5 per cent of the work force failed to come to
(Continued on page 229)

Prior to his arrival in the United States in 1949, **Edward Taborsky** was Czechoslovakia's ambassador to Sweden. During World War II he served as personal aide to the late President Eduard Beneš of Czechoslovakia. His earlier academic career included teaching at Charles University (Prague, Czechoslovakia), the University of Stockholm (Sweden), Ohio State University and the University of Tennessee. He is author of nine books and many articles in scholarly journals; his book, *Communism in Czechoslovakia: 1948-1960*, was published by Princeton University Press in 1961, and his upcoming book, *Communist Penetration of the Third World*, will be published by Robert Speller and Sons (New York).

“... it may be difficult to describe Rumania's complex course at home and abroad under a single rubric. . . . Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the Rumanian approach to communism deserves a label. . . . Why not adopt *Ceauseschism*?”

Ceauseschism: Rumania's Road To Communism

BY RADU R. FLORESCU

Associate Professor of History, Boston College

NEWSMEN ARE IN THE HABIT of coining misleading slogans about Rumania's so-called “national” communism. A favorite headline reads: “Tight at Home and Polycentrist Abroad.” At times, the press focuses on individual incidents to dramatize the country's plight. The wire services recently highlighted the case of the daughter of a Rumanian emigré, Vasile Posteuca, who was presumably denied an exit visa to visit her dying father in the United States. In point of fact, admittedly with the customary delays, the lady was given permission to leave the country, and she has since sought asylum in the United States. The gist of all this is that the newly created science of *Rumanology* is even more unpredictable than the complex pursuit of *Kreminology*.

Anyone claiming to speak knowledgeably about Rumania can do no better than read the six volumes of speeches by President of the Council of State Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Rumania on the Way of Completing Socialist Construction: Reports, Speeches, Articles, 1962–1965*.¹ What is impressive, apart from the rough and at times poetic peasant language, is the omniscient competency of the range of topics covered, the infinite variety of solutions proposed, and the consistency of the themes which have not varied substantially since 1965.

¹ Much of the discussion that follows is based on Ceaușescu's writings in these volumes.

² “There are some theoreticians who take upon themselves the right of giving definitive judgment, upon the principle: ‘Le marxisme c'est moi!’ No, nobody can affirm that ‘Marxism is I!’ Marxism-Leninism is nobody's property!” Nicolae Ceaușescu, *Rumania on the Way of Completing Socialist Construction* (Bucharest: 1969), vol. 3, p. 445.

³ “The Rumanians, Magyars, Germans and working people of other nationalities make up the big family of socialist Rumania.” Ceaușescu, *Rumania*, vol. 1, p. 119.

⁴ The regime has now officially rejected the term “multinational” state adopted at the third, fourth and fifth Congress of the Rumanian Communist party.

Indeed, Ceaușescu's concern for detail accentuates Rumania's pragmatic approach to socialism. This inherent anti-dogmatism has been expressed by the Rumanian leader, Louis XIV-style: no leader can assert “*le marxisme, c'est moi*,” and no nation has a monopoly on truth.² Implementation of communism is conditioned by prevailing historical circumstances and concrete social and economic developments which are constantly changing. This *terre à terre* and evolutionary approach to ideology may tempt the analyst into a facile assertion that Ceaușescu is a pragmatist, that the Marxism of yesterday may in due course become so diluted as to be scarcely recognizable. Even a cursory examination of some tenets in Rumania's approach to communism should lead to a different conclusion.

We are often told that the Rumanians are nationalists. The term is ambiguous; the French in this respect are more meticulous in confining the meaning of the word *nationalisme* to imposing the will of one nation over another, a concept decidedly rejected by Rumanians. Even in terms of national consciousness, Ceaușescu has eliminated most of the traditional ingredients of Rumanian nationality emphasizing race, national character, language, culture and religion. In a novel concept of nationality, all ethnic groups who for centuries have lived together within the natural frontier forming Rumania's territory—the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Carpathian Mountains—the Germans, Serbs, Hungarians and Szekelys, belong to the fatherland, irrespective of their cultural, ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity.³ Their cultural contributions are a source of enrichment to the common fatherland. Officially, Rumania is no longer “a multinational state” as it was before the war, the whipping-boy heightening international tensions during the Trianonist period. Nor does the regime favor the assimilation of non-Rumanian ethnic groups.⁴ The American “melting-pot phenomenon” is outdated.

The regime supports the Swiss model of a nation and is as proud of the German descendants of the Teutonic crusader as it is of Rumania's Dacian forefathers and Roman cultural mentors. Even the artistic and architectural contributions of the Roman Catholic Church, a national enemy during the bourgeois period, have been tastefully restored, not for the sake of Catholicism, but because they belong to the national legacy.

There is a recurrent emphasis on traditional national heroes like Dracula, with a two-fold purpose: in the absence of those ingredients of nationality which have recently been deemphasized, the hero who fought on native soil—whether real or legendary—assumes the importance of a William Tell in strengthening the bonds of national sentiment. In Dracula's time, both Rumanians and Hungarians fought for independence from Turkish rule.⁵ Secondly, there is the point of continuity: history provides an obvious link between past and present, between the pre-socialist and the post-socialist period. This thread was deemphasized during the *tabula rasa* phase of postwar Stalinism, which is denounced by the regime as destructive of nationality. In a mystical sense, this theme of common "Rumanity" has also been helpful in creating a tenuous bridge between Rumania and the Rumanian community throughout the world at large, which is being gradually reclaimed as part of the national fold. The regime is almost as proud of Eugene Ionescu's *Rhinoceros* as it is of the accomplishments of Rumania's scientists living abroad.

Coupled with this historical and territorial notion of the fatherland—the word *patria* is used far more frequently than *națiune*—is the theory of absolute political sovereignty, so jealously guarded in recent years. In Rumania's view, however, there is no contradiction between this new and more advanced ideal of nationalism and socialist internationalism. With the triumph of socialism, tensions among nations will lessen, but the mystical *patria* will never wither away.

The word "democracy" is used in Rumania as frequently as in America, although it is understood differently. The regime has rejected the Western political experience which has never worked in the past, in favor of a new formula defined as the participation of all citizens in the multiple activities of the state, within the norms of philosophical conformity imposed by Marxism. This is by no means an easy task. Unlike the Czech, the Rumanian is not a "political animal" and the nation, however gifted, has yet to produce a first-rate political thinker or philosopher. Moreover, cowed by centuries of oppression from within and from without (of which postwar Stalinism is but the latest manifestation), the masses have be-

come politically apathetic, an attitude characterized by the fatalistic approach to life of Johann Moritz, the peasant hero of C. Virgil Gheorghiu's *The Twenty-Fifth Hour*. The problem of the regime is how to awaken the nation from its century-long lethargy: how to get people to talk, to criticize, to debate, to assume responsibilities and to take initiatives—in a word, to become involved in the political life of the nation.

Substantial efforts have been made in the direction of a dialogue between leaders and followers, between the Communist establishment and the rank and file, between party and people. The executive has been told to be collectively answerable for its actions to the Grand National Assembly; the Grand National Assembly has been ordered to be more responsive to the electors; the District Councils, to refrain from referring all problems to Bucharest; regional enterprises (as in Tito's Yugoslavia, there is an economic and managerial counterpart to political democratization), to consult the workers, the technicians and the technocrats at the factory level; the media has been instructed to denounce shoddiness and inefficiency.

ELITIST CRITICISM

However, it is difficult to impose democracy from above when problems abound and when strict limitations are prescribed on the extent of an individual's ability to criticize. From the vantage point of 1973, the dialogue is noticeable, if at all, within a comparatively small elite, among the upper echelons of the political technocratic and intellectual establishment. Within the new class, one can distinguish subtle shades of non-conformity, but each infringement of the Marxist golden mean entails sanctions of its own. This is evidenced by recent reshuffles within the Cabinet itself, where both Foreign Secretary C. Mănescu and Minister of Education L. Malița were recently dismissed. On the whole, the provinces are less restricted than the capital; artists and musicians are given greater zest for self-expression than the philosophers; among historians freedom depends on period and subjects. Generally, the more removed the topic from ticklish problems of the twentieth century, the greater the latitude of non-conformity. The public media, particularly the producers of movies and television programs, have of late been made painfully aware of their shortcomings in imitating decadent bourgeois themes and concepts.

On the other hand, imprisonment for political offenses has virtually ceased. Although the regime professes to be atheistic, God is less dead in socialist Rumania than in the capitalist West, and churches are full. The frontiers of the country are among the most accessible in East Europe and security is discreet and discredited. To resolve the most embarrassing current problems of defection, the regime has recently

⁵ See R. McNally and R. Florescu, *In Search of Dracula* (New York: New York Graphic Society, 1972).

de facto created a new category, permanent intellectual resident abroad, entitled to maintain Rumanian citizenship.

There is a final explanation for the nation's unquestionable trust in the present leadership. One might say that ever since Ceaușescu's famous speech of August 21, 1968, during the Czech crisis, the regime has been popular in a broad sense and represents, in the American meaning, the will of the majority.⁶ Indeed, Ceaușescu's frequent public appearances, shaking hands, kissing babies, and traveling around the country, remind one of an American President who is stomping the country and electioneering to ascertain the nation's mood on the eve of a great crisis. Just as the American public wants to see the President exert his powers as Commander in Chief in a crisis, in Rumania, there is a kind of instinctive faith in the sagacity of the pilot who has successfully weathered some of the worst storms in the country's history. Besides, should the leader disappear, there is the haunting specter of possible alternatives or a lack thereof. The fact that the regime has allowed the weapons which were distributed to the people at the time of the Czech crisis to remain in their possession confirms their confidence in its leadership. Politically, however, the nation continues dormant, and nothing is less controversial than a *Scînteia* headline.

The concept of "socialist humanism" is often substituted for that of "socialist democracy" and at times makes more sense. Communist man is to be raised to new lofty ethical, cultural and material heights. Since men can never be completely equal, an obvious danger was pointed out by Yugoslav author Milovan Djilas in the *New Class*. To avoid this, since 1968, sinecures and double jobs favoring the few have been abolished; the number of chauffeur-driven limousines has been drastically reduced; and a new judicial code has been devised to combat the proletarian favoritism of the early years. Equality of opportunity has been enforced Napoleon-style, and the former second-class-citizen son of a bourgeois banker or landlord now has at least an equal chance to enter a medical school or a university. With reference to the hybrid and tentacular administrative state-apparatus, the words "bureaucratism," "inertia" and "inefficient" often figure in the Ceaușescu pep talks. Lately, austerity has been the watchword even in Rumania's more prestigious embassies and other missions abroad.

⁶ The speech was held at a popular rally in Republic Square in Bucharest on August 21, 1968. Similar words are contained in a speech delivered at the Grand National Assembly on August 20, 1968.

⁷ Constantin C. Giurescu & Dinu C. Giurescu, *Istoria Românilor* (Bucharest, 1971).

⁸ In an interview on September 20, 1971, in the Beirut *Al-Hawadess Review*, Ceaușescu stated that Rumanian industries produced 18 times more than in 1938, the year with the highest output during bourgeois rule. Ceaușescu, *Rumania*, vol. 6, p. 425.

This refurbished mid-Victorian code of ethics, all the more noticeable in the absence of organized religion, is particularly *de rigueur* for the top echelons of the Communist hierarchy. The slightest scandal or moral misdemeanor may well lead to excommunication and dismissal from office. Within the last few months, it has been rumored that the self-styled "moral educator" of the country is Ceaușescu's wife, Elena Ceaușescu—a fact which has caused some antagonism to her husband, in a country where "women's liberation" is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, the spirit of socialist puritanism permeates all levels of society and affects legislation. Divorce any style is frowned upon; "the pill" is illegal; and the younger generation has thus far kept aloof from drugs, perhaps for lack of opportunity.

Cultural gains, however, have been spectacular. In a nation where illiteracy was rampant only yesterday, it is no exaggeration to say that the public is more selective in its reading than its American counterpart and is possibly better informed on the world at large. Professor Constantin C. Giurescu, who held the Iorga History chair at Columbia University during 1970–1971, saw his impressive 800-page tome on Rumanian history sold out within months of publication.⁷ The thirst for knowledge is so great that some books are sold out in the capital before they reach the provinces. A popular historical magazine (*Magazinul Istoric*), which is sold at newspaper stands throughout the land, has a circulation of 200,000, far in excess of similar journals in West Europe or the United States. Facts such as these tend to substantiate a boast to the effect that Rumanian education is at every level comparable to that prevailing in advanced societies.

The material benefits of a "good life" are slow in coming. Starting from the humble formula of freedom from want, spelled out two decades ago, goals are now stated more positively: a flat, a car and a television set for every family. Most Rumanians want a higher living standard more than they want socialist democracy. American visitors to Rumania are rarely asked: "how does your presidential system of government work?" but far more often: "what proportion of your salary goes toward the purchase of a car?"

It is invidious to deal in statistics since figures often lie. One can refer the reader to Ceaușescu's speeches echoing the percentages of industrial and agricultural growth in the years since 1938, repeated ad nauseam in the press.⁸ Given all the insufficiencies and adverse circumstances created by the postwar period, Rumania's economic recovery is little short of miraculous, particularly if one takes into account the years of relentless Soviet exploitation and the absence of Western aid. No one is rich in Rumania today but neither is anyone desperately poor.

As a nation of former peasants, the people are legitimately proud of their technological accomplish-

ments. In the American South, one often notices a sticker which reads: "made in Texas by Texans." There is a current Rumanian equivalent which could be affixed on the new Dacia car manufactured at Pitești (even though it has been made according to the French Renault formula). The Rumanian U-400 tractor is described as "the most rugged in the world"; the hydro-electric dam on the Danube, a combined Rumanian-Yugoslav technical venture, "the second largest of its kind in Europe." Recently, a highly sophisticated Rumanian jeep, the U-500, has found its way to the American market, and Rumanian fashion designers are competing with Christian Dior the world over.

If pragmatism is the valid approach, any method short of restoring capitalism is acceptable for beating the West at its own game: profit as a criterion for economic viability and incentive; buying in the cheapest and selling in the most expensive market (Rumanian diplomats and trade experts have been instructed to be as "tough" in their commercial dealings abroad as any tight-pocketed capitalists); regionalizing the province; mechanizing and chemicalizing agriculture; setting up joint-stock enterprises with capitalistic partners (provided the Rumanians have controlling interests); learning advanced merchandising and marketing techniques, even at the Harvard Business School. The "sale" concept was presumably learned in Filene's basement, and the country's best salesmen are its diplomats. These are just a few examples of the methods used for increasing production and productivity. If Rumania could "catch up" within the foreseeable future—the housing shortage is presumably to be solved by 1980—then indeed the world might be ripe for socialism. The Rumanian peasant has exhibited an amazing ability to learn advanced Western technology fast, and peasants are busy tucking their picturesque native shirts into their trousers at an extraordinary pace. This has been noted by Ceausescu, who is fond of repeating that almost any product, no matter how complex, can be produced within the frontier of the country.

Such optimism is not always convincing in a nation that has born standards of austerity for so long. Sober reflection and current indications seem to indicate that without substantial Western financial and technical aid, the "catching-up" dream lies nowhere close on the horizon.

FOREIGN POLICY

One cannot avoid a brief digression on foreign policy, most often dramatized and misunderstood. Contrary to the so-called experts, Rumanian diplomacy is inseparable from domestic policy. The world is familiar with the chief tenets of Rumania's alleged polycentrism. One facet of this policy invites a comparison between Ceausescu and Bismarck, "juggling

with five balls in the air at one and the same time." How is it possible in this divided world, ask the critics, simultaneously to possess the confidence of 98 heads of state? Is this not proof of cynicism or opportunism? Of course, it might be said that historically "byzantinism" has been an ingredient in Rumania's national survival.

The temper of Rumanian diplomacy in recent years has been thoroughly international-minded. Bucharest sponsors more international, cultural and scientific congresses than Washington or London. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ion Gheorge Maurer spends as little time in Rumania as Rumanian tennis star "nasty Nastase," a practitioner of the popular form of athletic diplomacy, a plus factor in public relations up to the time of the latest Davis cup confrontation in Bucharest. Most of these international political, cultural and even athletic ventures, including President Richard Nixon's historic visit to Bucharest in the summer of 1969, were initiated by Rumania.

In this respect, nothing is more impressive than the dialogues resumed with the West and particularly with West Germany, France and the United States. These exchanges can in part be measured in commercial terms: 40 per cent of Rumania's trade is now transacted with non-socialist states. Commerce, however, implies more than the exchange of goods; it means exchanging persons, scientists, technicians, industrial exhibits and fairs. It means the presence of English steelworkers in Galatz and Rumanian tractor engineers in Teheran. Trade, moreover, is evidently related to cultural exchange. One of the most tangible achievements of the Nixon visit of 1969 was a treaty which provided for tripling the number of scholars visiting one another's countries and saw the opening of reciprocal library facilities in Bucharest and New York. The chief problem so far in implementing the agreement has not been a lack of Rumanian desire to send scholars abroad, but the scarcity of American scholars interested in or equipped to

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Radu Florescu has published numerous articles and books on East Europe and specifically on Rumania. Among these are *The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities* (Munich: 1963), "The Uniate Church Catalyst of Romanian National Consciousness," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XIV (July, 1967), "Stratford, Canning, Palmerston, and the Wallachian Revolution of 1848," *Journal of Modern History*, XXV (1963). His most recent book, coauthored with Raymond T. McNally, is *In Search of Dracula* (New York: New York Graphic Society, 1972). During President Nixon's visit to Rumania in August, 1969, Professor Florescu served as press liaison at the American Embassy in Bucharest.

Reform in Hungary "revamped the economic system . . . ; loosened the rigid political structure; and . . . brought benefits of liberalized rule and increased prosperity to the population." In addition, "it caused the people to accept the present government as legitimate."

Hungary in the Seventies: The Era of Reform

BY IVAN VOLGYES

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SINCE HUNGARY SLIPPED behind the "Iron Curtain" in 1948, enormous changes have taken place there. The Communist regime attempted to mobilize the entire society to drag the nation kicking and screaming into the twentieth century. The methods that were utilized were often brutal and cruel. The purges and spy trials that cut down hundreds of Hungarians, the infamous forced labor camps and the terroristic methods of collectivization are well-known to most students of recent history.

During the years from 1948 to 1956, the entire population was forced to participate in the national effort to industrialize the country, regardless of the social costs. The people were also forced to participate publicly in the political processes of the regimes. Marches and demonstrations and endless slogans filled the daily lives of the citizenry. Everyone was expected to be politically active, collecting signatures for mass appeals, buying state bonds, and engaging in constant agitation-propaganda activities or in seminars on ideology. Almost the entire Gross National Product of the country was reinvested in the creation of heavy industries at a great public sacrifice of needed housing and consumer goods. Dissatisfaction with this era of Communist rule led to the revolution of 1956, which was brutally crushed by the U.S.S.R. This was the legacy of the past in Hungary. Its future is being charted by a new course.

János Kádár, installed after the end of the revolution, inherited a country whose population was sullen,

bitter, and largely unwilling to work. For the first decade, Kádár's rule was characterized by inactivity and by searching for a new system of government, Communist in form, but acceptable both to the citizenry of Hungary and to the rulers of the U.S.S.R. More than ten years after he came to power, Kádár was able to come up with a solution to this problem. During the early spring of 1968, the Hungarian Socialist Worker's party began to implement the most far-reaching reform program Communist Hungary—and perhaps any Communist state—has ever undertaken. The aims of the reform were to liberalize the economic system, to loosen the rigidity and stultification of the political system, and to bring greater economic and political benefits to the citizenry.¹

At the inception of the program, called the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), the regime made it clear to the population that its aims were limited.² Very soon it became obvious that the reform did not mean a return to capitalism; it did not mean the re-establishment of opposition parties or other forms of "bourgeois" democracy; and, most importantly, the NEM did not mean the adoption of an independent foreign policy which could in any way be viewed as hostile by the U.S.S.R. The regime was trying to implement a policy that was liberal and national in content but retained the Soviet blessing. As a popular Hungarian joke had it: "Kádár was trying to make an iron wheel out of wood."

There were many reasons why the Hungarian Communist leadership embarked on a new course in 1968. During the previous decade, there seemed to be no real progress in Hungarian life. The economy was operating in a laggard manner, and it was doubtful whether the country was even keeping pace with its neighbors, let alone increasing its industrial development. The party was firmly in power, but it had little popular support. The population was

¹ For the most comprehensive works on the 1968 reforms see two English-language publications of the Hungarian government: Ottó Gadó (ed.), *Reform of the Economic Mechanism in Hungary: Development, 1968-1971* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972) and István Friss, *Reform of the Economic Mechanism of Hungary* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1969).

² Gyula Kállai, "Gazdasági reform és a társadalom fejlődése" (Economic Reform and the Development of Society), *Társadalmi Szemle*, June, 1968, pp. 6-14.

sullen, and it still regarded the leaders as Soviet puppets, not legitimate, popular choices. In addition, the presence of Soviet troops, as well as the continuous support Hungary was lending to the U.S.S.R., further aggravated the malaise of the body politic.³

A THREE-PRONGED REFORM

The party began the first phase of its reforms with a three-pronged attack on the ailing political and economic system. Its aims were to liberalize the economic system, to democratize the political system, and to bring greater social and material benefits to the citizenry. By accomplishing these tasks the party hoped to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the people. To revitalize the economy, centralized planning has been drastically reduced. The Central Planning Office, which once directed virtually every aspect of the entire economy of the country, now must content itself with establishing rough guidelines, projecting the availability of raw materials, predicting market demands, and serving as a clearinghouse for much needed fiscal and technical information.

The management of firms, enterprises and other institutions was removed from the purview of party hacks and returned to able and responsible managers who generally are left alone to establish their own priorities, their own production schedules and their own quality-control systems. While in the past there was little differentiation in salary levels between the managers and the lowest unskilled worker, rewards for work and responsibility have been reintroduced. The price control system, once carefully defined and supervised to the last *fillér*, has been revised. It now incorporates some elements of the principle of supply and demand and some free market prices. Government control extends to establishing maximum-minimum price ranges and fixing prices for some necessities, such as bread.

Another aspect of the economic reform is a downgrading of the previously all-important goal of heavy industrial development and a new recognition of the importance of agriculture. The collective farm system has been revamped to favor the most productive collectives, whose members now find membership in these institutions financially attractive. By stimulating private initiative and by infusing state subsidies and

significant amounts of state capital into the agricultural sector, the regime has given the peasantry a boost toward a better living standard.

As a result of the economic changes, export and import activities with the West have been expanded. Most of Hungary's largest firms have been allowed to seek direct contact with Western companies and to embark on mutual ventures with those Western firms desirous of cooperation. Even the country's national bank began a westward expansion by floating a national bank bond in the West.

Along with economic changes, the Hungarian government began to try to broaden its political bases and to reform its stultified political system. The new electoral law of 1966 permitted multi-candidate elections and broadened the process of nominating candidates to include nominations from organizations other than the local party cells.⁴ In 1967, only five districts had more than one candidate on the ballot for parliamentary seats, but by 1971, in 49 out of 352 electoral districts, there were two candidates on the ballot, giving 15 per cent of the population a choice.⁵ In one Budapest electoral district, there were three candidates running for a parliamentary seat; the surprise winner was a blind, 28-year-old associate professor, who defeated two workers.⁶

At the same time, the party's grass-root organizations were expanded, and an attempt was made to include more people in the activities of these organizations. The population was urged to acquire a "sense of participation in democracy" by joining in the various local organs of power.⁷ The party also tried to open its own ranks to the populace by abolishing candidate membership and by a serious effort to recruit from the younger strata of the population. At the same time, the party also tried to limit the power of its middle-echelon leaders by instructing them not to interfere with the processes of production—to allow the new factory managers to be free of political concerns as they worked.⁸

The third facet of the reform was perhaps the hardest to implement: Bringing greater benefits to the citizenry depended on the functioning of the New Economic Mechanism and there was little the party could do to hasten the process of growth. Nonetheless, some visible benefits could be provided immediately. Thus, the party revamped its restrictions on Hungarian travel to the West. Eligibility requirements for travel as well as for obtaining hard currency and passports to the West were clearly stated, and the new policies were implemented in spite of some widely publicized defections. There was a sudden increase in automobile imports, both of Soviet *Zhigulis* and *Polski Fiats*, driving the price of used cars sharply downward. More and more foreign goods, from Johnson Wax to Scotch whiskey, were imported and were greedily purchased by a goods-

³ One of the best literary descriptions of that malaise was Ferenc Sánta's excellent novel, *Husz Óra* (Twenty Hours) (Budapest: Magvető, 1964).

⁴ *Választójogi törvény* (Electoral Law) (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1967), pp. 60–71.

⁵ For the electoral list see *Népszabadság* (April 3, 1971).

⁶ *Népszabadság* (April 27, 1971).

⁷ Béla Biszku, *A párt és az állam a nép szolgálatában* (The Party and the State in the Service of the People) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1972), pp. 249–259.

⁸ *Pártmunkások kézikönyve, 1971* (The Handbook of Party Workers, 1971) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1971), pp. 11–23.

starved populace in spite of their very high prices. Greater measures of personal and literary expression were also given to the population, to bolster the growing public sentiment that "things definitely are getting better."

There can be no question that the reform itself was reasonably successful. It revamped the economic system and stimulated at least some economic growth; it loosened the rigid political structure; and it brought benefits of liberalized rule and increased prosperity to the population. But beyond these goals it accomplished something else which was one of the most significant purposes behind the reform movement: it caused the people to accept the present government as legitimate. Kádár, once regarded as a mere quisling, became a genuinely popular leader. What all the appeals to the mandate of history, all the slogans concerned with the inevitability of communism and all the repetition of Marxist dogma did not accomplish, the reform policies succeeded in accomplishing. Thus, five years after the inception of the reform, Hungary faces the early 1970's with a positive experience from its recent past.

PROBLEMS AHEAD

The future faced by the Hungarian leadership, however, is certain to be complicated, and the road ahead may be relatively rocky. Both in the economic sphere and in the domestic political arena, the leadership must carve a new road along the rugged ledge of uncertainty.

The regime faces serious economic difficulties. After the Communist party came to power in 1948, the country followed a policy of rapid heavy industrialization. Lacking all but a few precious resources, it imported raw materials and built industries to make finished goods out of them. The new industries were based on the availability of cheap manpower and a ready-made competition-free market within the socialist bloc.⁹

The NEM and subsequent increased development changed this situation. The price of labor went up and the prices of imported raw materials continued to rise. The goods produced became more expensive; at the same time, their marketability was no longer assured, since they had to compete with goods imported from the West or from other socialist states. Lacking technology and the expensive machinery to produce these goods at a price lower than those produced in the West, lacking the domestic raw materials necessary for production and having to pay higher wages, the government now finds itself in a curious

quandary: if it continues to produce many of its products it must subsidize their prices in order to make them even minimally competitive on the domestic and international markets. The much needed hard currency that the export products can bring can only be earned at the cost of significant state support to industry.

An alternative, of course, would be to cut back on the much-touted industrial development and to dismember some of the less productive factories. This course has already been undertaken with most of the country's coal mines, which produced a very low-grade coal. It is possible that the regime will be willing to swallow its ideological pride in order to implement other phase-outs of unprofitable industries, but the social cost of such dismemberment—the unemployment, the retraining and the relocation of the workers employed in these industries—is a price the leaders appear unwilling and perhaps unable to pay. The dogma of industrialization created its own golem and the present leaders of the country are forced to live with the not-so-benevolent monster.

In the agrarian sphere, the weak collective farms and the unproductive regions are causing a great deal of concern. It will be necessary to evacuate whole villages in the non-productive regions. "Ghost villages" are being created in Zala and Hajdu-Bihar counties and elsewhere, as the leaders try to force the people in the area to abandon the futile effort to eke out a living from the used and poor soil. In the effort to encourage relocation of the population, permits for new wells are denied, roads are not being resurfaced, electric lines are not being maintained, and schools are concentrated in towns far away. This policy, of course, is causing widespread disaffection; yet in order to carry the NEM to a successful conclusion, the regime must be courageous enough to risk some discontent.

The new economic incentives for technocrats and managers, as well as the introduction of the profit motive, have created dissatisfaction among the lower strata of the skilled and semi-skilled laborers, the office personnel and the clerical workers. The new managers find the system easy to work in; aside from the legal profits frequently amounting to 50–60 per cent of their salaries, they also find new ways of earning profits by means of corruption and semi-legal kickbacks. Thus, the manager of a cooperative firm may receive his salary from one source, be on the board of directors of another firm and collect a consultant's fee from still another source.

Highly skilled workers can also call their own tunes. Freed from old restrictions which prevented them from changing jobs, they can seek other employment if they are unsatisfied with wages or working conditions. The unskilled manual laborers and construction workers can also call for inordinately

⁹ Iván T. Berend, "A termelőerők fejlődése: növekedés és strukturaváltozás Magyarországon a szocialista átalakulás negyedszázadában" (The Development of Productive Forces: Growth and Structural Changes in Hungary during Twenty-Five Years of Socialist Transformation), *Századok*, 4 (1970), pp. 827–868.

high wages because the shortage of this type of labor is acute. In addition, the 100,000 shopkeepers, service personnel and handicraftsmen engaged in the private sector are doing a "land-office" business. The NEM allowed certain kinds of private businesses to reopen after years of prohibition, and even with the high taxes they have to pay, these people are becoming very affluent.

Dissatisfaction with the reform comes largely from those who cannot benefit from the new system: lower-level skilled and semi-skilled workers, clerical employees, and middle-level intellectuals. For the workers in these categories life seemed to have been better under the old system, because then there were no striking differences in income within the populace. These people are reluctant to see an undifferentiated society become stratified into "haves" and "have-nots," because it appears that they will fall into the second category. For clerical employees, office workers, accountants, teachers and ledger-keepers, life has not significantly improved and, indeed, seems slightly worse. Even the old rhetoric of "workers' power" is gone, and its place has not been taken by new satisfaction. In fact, there is a growing apprehension among the strata of the dissatisfied about the newly developed elite whose lot appears considerably better than their own.

Overall increased prosperity and the relative freedom to travel in the West also brought with it an unexpectedly severe disaffection. Prosperity has brought a mania for material possessions which is almost impossible to satisfy, and increased travel provides the people with a basis of comparison in judging the regime's success. Most people who travel to the West become aware of the essential untruths in the boasts of advancement so frequently mouthed by the leaders of the socialist bloc.

Interestingly enough, Hungarians do not seem to compare their lot with the citizens of other socialist states—for such a comparison with the people of other bloc countries would be highly favorable—but with those living in the West. The resulting dissatisfaction is an unfair burden on the present leaders of Hungary and an additional problem with which they have to cope. Nonetheless, the population recognizes the essential improvement in their living standard over the past five years. They view life as less comfortable than it is in the West, but still far better than it has been for decades in Hungary. They believe almost universally that the country is on the move, and they regard Kádár as an able and genuinely popular leader.

POLITICS TODAY

In the political subsystem, Kádár and his fellow politicians have been eminently successful in maintaining their power base. They have been able to

legitimize their rule and even to assure themselves of popular support for their present policies. But the political aims of the reform—the broadening and democratizing of their rule—have not really been implemented. The grass-root organs of mass support are barely functioning. Although it is true that there have been some multi-candidate elections, the population did not get a sense of political efficacy, a sense of real participation in the decision making, out of the new process. Rather, the Hungarian attitude seems to be summed up in the riddle popular at the time of the elections in 1971. Q: "Where was the first, 'democratic' election?" A: "In the Garden of Eden when, pointing to Eve, God said, 'Adam, choose yourself a wife.'"

To be sure, this attitude seems to be encouraged by the leadership. Indeed, one of the greatest changes fostered by the present regime is a deliberate depoliticization of public life. The citizenry no longer has to participate in marches, demonstrations or continuous "agitation-propaganda" activities. Everyone is encouraged to mind his own business and to create better living conditions for himself. The continuation of this new view of citizens' obligations is necessary in order to preserve the leaders' monopoly of power and the monopoly of decision-making, while the electoral reforms are token gestures designed to pay lip-service to "democratization."

Kádár's course of reform during the last five years has been characterized by cautious and unpublicized alterations. Without the fanfare of Czechoslovak leader Aleksandr Dubček's reforms in the "Prague Spring," he has succeeded in implementing a new type of national communism which is liberal in domestic politics and rigidly pro-Soviet in its external political behavior. The present leadership realizes that it cannot enact more far-reaching reforms without provoking the ire of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, there are some signs that the regime will not allow activities which are critical of the Soviet Union. Thus, for

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"Slowly, rather like a troika of turtles, the talks on European security go on. Their effect on future strategic and political security arrangements in Europe depends very much on the attitudes developed in the process of talking. . . . That such negotiations are under way at all is due to a shift in attitude on the part of the superpowers, a shift that experts would have thought unthinkable five years ago."

European Security in the Era of Negotiation

BY ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON

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THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, currently referred to in the West as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is an idea whose time has come. It is not a new idea, nor is it always well received.

The first major enthusiasm for such a conference came from Moscow during the height of the cold war. At that time, the call for a European Security Conference to set up an all-European system of collective security was a Soviet diplomatic maneuver by which Joseph Stalin's successors hoped to block West German participation in NATO via the West European Union (WEU), then still in the early stages of discussion. First proposed by Vyacheslav M. Molotov to the conference of the Big Four Foreign Ministers in February, 1954 (in the form of a "treaty of collective security" in Europe), the idea expanded into a suggestion for a conference for the European states and the United States, which was invited by Moscow to associate with the proposed European system. Thus, initially, the thrust of the Kremlin's suggestion was not toward a pan-European arrangement designed to exclude Americans from political and military participation on the continent, but rather toward the objectives expressed even during Stalin's lifetime: 1) a guarantee against West German rearmament and, failing that, 2) a unified, minimally armed Germany whose neutrality would be guaranteed by the Big Four.¹

Western and particularly United States interest in such a project was nonexistent. From Washington's perspective, it risked sabotaging the still shaky machinery of NATO, to say nothing of undermining the

considerable United States diplomatic effort expended in convincing the European allies that—for the North Atlantic alliance to have teeth, for NATO to be viable—West Germany had to be accepted as a partner, not contained as The Enemy. Moreover, if there was anything that American policy-makers feared short of war in the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, it was negotiation with the Communists. Convinced that President Franklin Roosevelt had been duped at Yalta, that someone in the State Department (although it was never clear who) had "lost" China, American policy-makers considered negotiation with the Soviets a losing game, with the other side playing a "head's I win, tails you lose" strategy which automatically gave Moscow the advantage.

Therefore, not surprisingly, nothing came of Molotov's initiative. The Paris agreements authorizing the rearmament of West Germany and creating the WEU were signed October 23, 1954. On November 13, the U.S.S.R. sent a note, directed against ratification of the Paris agreements, and again inviting 23 European countries and the United States to participate in an all-European security conference to be held in Moscow at the end of that month. Its key passage warned that if the West Germans were in fact rearmed, "peace-loving European nations" (i.e., the Soviet Union and East Europe) would be obliged to take new measures to safeguard their own security.²

Of the 23 countries invited, only 8 showed up, limiting the Moscow conference to the Soviet Union and the somewhat less consolidated socialist states of East Europe. The participants agreed that if and when the Paris agreements were ratified "appropriate measures" would be taken.

Ratification occurred in early May, 1955. On May 14, the Soviet Union and the East European states

¹ Soviet note on the German question, March 10, 1972. For analysis see Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 535-537.

² *Pravda*, November 14, 1954; English text, *New Times* (Moscow), 46 (November 13, 1954), 3.

signed the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. In a sense, it is fair to say that even if this first abortive drive toward a European security conference did not cause the division of Europe into two hostile military blocs—they certainly existed *de facto* well before—that failure did formalize the existing situation in that it led to the Warsaw Pact.

For Europe, however, the 1970's started as a decade of hope. Despite occasional setbacks, *détente* seemed to be taking two steps forward to each step back. Tensions created by "the allied socialist" invasion of Czechoslovakia had faded. The brief return to cold war rhetoric that followed that act of Soviet repression melted under the generally favorable atmosphere coming in large part from Bonn, where West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democrat coalition intensified its *Ostpolitik*, signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and thereby improved its chances for better relations with East Europe. There was an optimistic upswing following the Moscow-Bonn and Bonn-Warsaw treaties recognizing the territorial status quo and pledging mutual renunciation of force, and in light of the hopes for the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Talks (SALT). A political climate in which a European security conference no longer seemed such an outlandish idea developed. By August, 1970, the Western press had begun treating Warsaw Pact appeals for a CSCE as a possibility instead of a propaganda ploy. Differences of approach notwithstanding, authoritative sources within NATO were reported as regarding such a conference as "quite likely" in 1971.

The timetable proved untenable because the West tied even multilateral preparations for a CSCE first to a Berlin settlement, then, more tentatively, to the question of mutual force reductions. Yet today it is more than "quite likely" that a European security conference will take place in 1973. As much as anything is certain in international politics, it is virtually a sure thing.

The rocky path to an all-European conference became smooth for the most part because of objective changes in the European political environment, not because of changes in attitude. From the NATO side, slowly, hesitatingly, it became impossible to ignore the fact that Western preconditions were being met. The Berlin agreement became a reality in

September, 1971. There were still snags of implementation, yet no one could deny that the major official obstacle to a CSCE had been removed.

Further initial Soviet resistance to NATO's counterproposal for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) put forward in 1968 (to some extent used to sidetrack interest in the more general conference among West European nations) was disappearing. Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, first at the twenty-fourth congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March, 1971, then in his Tbilisi speech in May, 1971, referred favorably to MBFR negotiations.

At least as important as these signs of reasonableness coming from Moscow was the hard fact—just beginning to be faced in Washington—that, like it or not, domestic considerations might eventually force the United States into unilateral reductions. Congress had not passed the mid-May, 1971, Mansfield amendment calling for mandatory cuts in United States forces in Europe (on the heels of a dollar crisis during which NATO allies had shown little concern for American economic difficulties). The amendment, however, rallied enough support to make the point. The handwriting was on the wall. Barring radical improvement in the United States economy (which in March, 1973, had hardly occurred), pressure for the withdrawal of United States European forces would predictably increase.

In such circumstances, involvement in MBFR negotiations had multiple advantages for the Richard Nixon administration. It undercut support for Senator Mike J. Mansfield (D., Mont.) and others demanding unilateral cuts. It meant that Moscow did not "get something for nothing."

Potentially, involvement would allay the fears of Washington's West European allies that the Americans would either 1) simply turn around and go home or 2) come to some bilateral deal with the Soviets over their heads and presumably to their disadvantage. And, not least important, it bought time; due to the complexity of any military reductions, such negotiations could reasonably be expected to become a protracted parley.

This is not to say that there was a marked rise in enthusiasm in Washington for the more general CSCE. But with the bilateral removal of some of the most crucial problems originally linked to such a conference and in the light of serious MBFR negotiations, there were fewer formal objections. This was especially true in view of increasing interest in the project on the part of small and medium-sized nations in West and East Europe.

Much has been written about Soviet motivations,³ much less about CSCE and MBFR from East European perspectives⁴ which are far from identical either

³ See Christoph Bertram, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 84 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, January, 1972).

⁴ Three interesting exceptions are A. Ross Johnson, *The Warsaw Pact European Security Campaign*, RAND, R-565-PR, Santa Monica, California, November, 1970; Wolfgang Kaliber, "Security Priorities in Eastern Europe," *Problems of Communism* 19, no. 3 (May-June, 1970), pp. 32-44; and Lawrence L. Whetten, "Recent Changes in East European Approaches to European Security," *The World Today*, 26, no. 7 (July, 1970), pp. 277-289.

with Moscow's perspectives or those of one another. Skeptics of the value of either or both negotiations usually regard such talks fundamentally as Soviet propaganda instruments designed to exacerbate differences within NATO, to edge the United States out of Europe, and to allow the Kremlin to consolidate its sphere of influence in East Europe. Certainly, the timing of the Warsaw Pact's renewed campaign for CSEC in March, 1969, lent credibility to the assumption at the time that the campaign was diversionary activity to distract attention from the 600,000 Soviet troops still occupying Czechoslovakia.

Nonetheless, the deepening and continuing détente in Europe symbolized by such negotiations does meet a number of intrinsic Soviet interests, apart from any Soviet desire to make difficulties for NATO. The Soviet economy has its own problems, most seriously, food shortages and an ailing agricultural system. In the Soviet Union, there is a genuine desire for access to Western technology, a real need to expand trade, and (particularly since Britain joined the Common Market) a desire to ensure that West European economic integration does not work to Soviet disadvantage. On the strategic side, troop reductions in Europe increase Soviet flexibility in dealing with the Chinese, which (given Sino-Soviet tensions) is probably an important consideration in Moscow.

EAST EUROPE'S VIEWPOINT

As for the East European members of the Warsaw Pact, their interests are primarily intra-alliance. It is often forgotten that the renewed drive for an all-European security conference in 1964 began in Warsaw, not in Moscow; that although the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee supported the idea of the conference in January, 1965, it was not publicly supported by the Soviet Union until April, 1966. Nor is Rumania's strong support for CSCE usually given enough weight. Ever since the Rumanians somehow maneuvered Soviet troops out of Rumania in 1958,⁵ long before Western commentators spoke gingerly of Soviet-Rumanian differences, Bucharest has been acting in its self-perceived vested interests.⁶ In any event, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee's sanctioning of bilateral as well as alliance-coordinated efforts directed toward security in Europe (October, 1969) in itself increased the options for independent foreign policy initiatives on the part of East European states.

At a minimum, East European policy-makers

could expect such opportunities to grow, once consultation progressed to the level of multilateral East-West preparations for the CSCE. These preliminary talks, involving 34 European states, the United States and Canada, began in Helsinki in late November, 1972, and resumed after a Christmas recess in January, 1973. And even at this stage, the Rumanians put forward serious (to the Soviets embarrassing) demands to be heard on a number of procedural issues, in contrast to Western cohesion. At a maximum, East European countries still hosting Soviet troops may hope to see those forces either cut or withdrawn, thereby upping the likelihood that they can consider following Bucharest's example.

The East Germans are an obvious exception to general East European optimistic expectations for the CSCE. True, to be allowed to participate on an equal footing with the other countries taking part brings the Erich Honecker regime one step closer to that international recognition so long coveted by the German Democratic Republic. Nonetheless, there are signs that Moscow's rapprochement with Bonn, the Berlin agreement—with its corollary of "inner-German talks"—and the general tenor of events leading to the current negotiations were considered threatening by the East German leadership. Certainly East German leader Walter Ulbricht and Honecker viewed the whole idea of "inner-German" discussions with a distaste that smacked of fear. There is evidence that Ulbricht tried to use the coalition machinery of the Warsaw Pact to block not only Rumanian recognition of West Germany in 1967 but also an independent Polish policy toward Bonn in 1969–1970. When he failed, Ulbricht was not above hinting mysteriously that he might rethink East Germany's posture towards Peking. (At the CPSU twenty-fourth congress Ulbricht, unlike the other East European delegates—again excepting Rumania—did not attack the Chinese.) This hint may have been instrumental in his replacement in May, 1971. Honecker is undeniably more vulnerable to Soviet pressure than his predecessor, because the new leader of the East German party lacks Walter Ulbricht's long-standing prestige in the international Communist movement. Still, one should be careful about assuming that he can be pushed. Honecker has held back on even the idea of troop cuts; he did not repeat Brezhnev's reference to force reductions when the Soviet leader visited the G.D.R. in November, 1971; and he can be expected to be a more willing participant of CSCE than of MBFR. This is true despite the G.D.R.'s reluctant acceptance of a détente in which de jure recognition of East Germany did not come as part of a package which included recognition of the territorial status quo—most particularly the Oder-Neisse boundary between Poland and West Germany—a Berlin agreement and the CSCE.

⁵ For a controversial but (in this author's view) plausible account of the connections between Soviet withdrawal from Rumania and the early stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute see Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania: From a People's Democracy to a Socialist Republic* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969).

⁶ Robert R. King, "Rumanien und die europäische Sicherheit," *Europa Archiv*, 22 (1972), pp. 775–784.

Since 1973 is clearly the year of actual negotiations, students of European affairs must figure out what is supposed to happen at which conference table and how it relates to the other forums. This is not a simple matter, even for the participants, who have indicated both preferences and disagreements on the most fundamental question of who meets, where, with whom, about what.

SALT II

On all these levels, the SALT II conference—the second round of bilateral superpower talks which resumed in Geneva on March 12—is the least controversial. Round one, in which Soviet-American negotiators wrestled with problems of limiting and reducing offensive strategic weapons during November-December, 1972, produced no significant progress beyond that achieved in the SALT I conference (November, 1969–May, 1972), which yielded a United States-Soviet treaty limiting defensive nuclear weapons and a five-year interim limitation on some offensive weapons. SALT II has no relationship to CSCE; it could, in the future at least, confront demands that there be some links with the multilateral MBFR negotiations. However, that is a problem for tomorrow.

THE CSCE

Of the three sets of negotiations, CSCE has made the most progress. The multilateral preparations at the ambassadorial level that resumed in January, 1973, focus on producing an agenda for a full-scale foreign ministers' conference anticipated for June or July, most likely also to be held in Helsinki. The exploratory talks include representatives of all the nations of Europe (except Albania who, with the stubbornness of Tirana's proud, almost blood-feuding mentality, refuses even to sit down with Moscow), the United States and Canada. There is general agreement on some, not all, aspects of the agenda, which can be conveniently divided into four parts:

1. With regard to economic and cultural exchanges, both East and West support expanded contacts, although there is some grumbling in the West that such contacts will give more material advantage to the East because of differences in technological development.

2. Point 1 leads into the more controversial demand from the West for freer movement of people, information and ideas. In principle, Moscow does not object to increased cultural exchange, which amounts (in implementation) to much the same thing. Yet this particular formulation is read in the East as a sanction of ideological subversion, with undertones of an attempt to interfere in Soviet-East European internal affairs. Whether it becomes a

stumbling block depends largely on wording, for there is often more elasticity in possible behavior than the Communist's somewhat ritualized jargon would indicate. Despite signs that the current formula would meet stiff resistance, Brezhnev himself did not react unfavorably to the general idea.

3. A similar and more serious problem of semantics (which may stalemate discussions on the most sensitive issue up for discussion) concerns what in the West is called the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty within the socialist commonwealth. Brezhnev personally denounced this doctrine as a Western "fabrication" during his visit to Belgrade in September, 1971. Nonetheless, if the issue is raised in these terms, the Soviets and the East European invaders of Czechoslovakia as well will undoubtedly fight to the last ditch for their right to a separate "socialist" international law.

This is not to say that a compromise wording would be unacceptable. The Warsaw Pact itself has not supported the underlying principle of the doctrine of limited sovereignty among socialist states. At the meeting of the alliance's Political Consultative Committee in January, 1972, an interesting declaration was issued calling for:

Creation of a system of commitments precluding any use of force or threat of force in the mutual relations among the states in Europe, a system guaranteeing *all* the countries that they are protected from acts of aggression. . . .⁷

In this writer's conversations on matters of European security in Poland during the fall of 1971, the Poles did not hesitate to point out that the term "all countries" includes socialist and non-socialist countries alike. In some cases, they went so far as to say that the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 would have been "unnecessary" had an all-European system of collective security existed.

Be that as it may. History graphically demonstrates that all agreements are scraps of paper when powerful nations choose to disregard them or feel that they have become in some way diametrically opposed to vital national interests. Still, in my view, it would be wise for the West to take seriously the proposal for adopting principles governing relations among states and the renunciation of force rather than to deadlock the issue by insisting on a public retraction of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The adage that he who wears the shoe knows where it pinches is worth remembering.

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⁷ Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) XXIV (February 23, 1972). (Italics mine.)

BOOK REVIEWS

ON EAST EUROPE

THE CZECHOSLOVAK REFORM MOVEMENT: COMMUNISM IN CRISIS, 1962-1968. By GALIA GOLAN. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 349 pages, bibliography and index, \$16.50.)

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, ended one of the most remarkable developments in the post-1945 Soviet empire: the internal transformation of a Communist political system from Stalinism to the threshold of institutional liberalization. In this impressive scholarly work, Professor Galia Golan of Hebrew University traces the complex and unanticipated pressures which brought about the movement for reform. She analyzes the role and behavior of various groups: party leaders interested in revitalizing the country's lagging economy; intellectuals seeking democratization; Slovaks trying to cast off Czech domination; and governmental pressure groups vying for power. The study is well-written.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

REFORM RULE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE DUBČEK ERA 1968-1969. By GALIA GOLAN. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 327 pages, bibliography and index, \$18.50.)

The halcyon days of liberalization and hope in Czechoslovakia are the focus of this thoroughly researched and ably written study of the period in 1968 before the Soviet Union stepped in to squelch the reform movement. The author also provides an evaluation of the Soviet invasion and its impact on the key political groups. The book is written in a manner that will make it as interesting to the general reader as it is informative to the specialist.

A.Z.R.

THE HERO'S CHILDREN: THE POSTWAR GENERATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. By PAUL NEUBERG. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1973. 384 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

This informative, highly readable account of the youth culture in East Europe takes a look at attitudes toward family, society, dissent, work, play and school. It makes it clear that party leaders have been unable to convince the younger generation of the delights of communism: the West re-

mains the land of dreams for people living behind the somewhat rusted and porous iron curtain.

A.Z.R.

INDIA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE 1953-54 and 1969-70. By ASHA L. DATAR. (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. 278 pages, bibliography and index, \$18.50.)

This pioneering work evaluates the contribution of the Soviet bloc countries to India's economic and industrial development. Going beyond the usual description of how much assistance the U.S.S.R. gives, it examines the relative costs, the effectiveness, the comparative quality, and the impact of the aid. A thoroughly researched and tightly reasoned study, it will prove invaluable to specialists.

A.Z.R.

HONECKER AND THE NEW POLITICS OF EUROPE. By HEINZ LIPPMANN. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. 272 pages and index, \$7.95.)

East Germany is the most important and powerful country in Moscow's imperial system in East Europe. In May, 1971, Erich Honecker took over control of East Germany from aging Walter Ulbricht. The author of this illuminating biography has known Honecker for many years and worked closely with him, especially in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The book is serious, rather than sensational, and is a highly welcome work on an important subject.

A.Z.R.

THE BERLIN CRISIS OF 1961: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE KREMLIN, June-November 1961. By ROBERT M. SLUSSER. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 509 pages, glossary, bibliography, and index, \$17.50 cloth; \$8.50 paper.)

Professor Robert Slusser has written an important book. His study of the Berlin crisis of June-November, 1961, strips a great deal of the mystery from Soviet politics and foreign policy-making in Moscow. Based on an exhaustive examination of all available evidence and the idea that chronology is important in studying history, the book presents a fascinating account of intrigue, crisis-manipula-

tion, and diplomacy. The scholarship is impeccable, the writing lucid, and the analysis compelling. This book deserves to be widely read and discussed.
A.Z.R.

YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1972. EDITED BY RICHARD F. STARR. (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 708 pages, chronology, bibliography, and index, \$25.00.)

This authoritative survey of developments in the Communist world treats the calendar year 1971. As always, the 100 essays provide an informed evaluation of key events in the major Communist-front organizations as well as in the principal regions and countries of the world. This is an invaluable reference work.
A.Z.R.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION. BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (New York: Random House, 1972. Third Edition. 474 pages and index, \$6.50.)

This revised edition of a standard work in the field has been expanded to include chapters on the Leonid Brezhnev period and Soviet policy in the United Nations. The sections on East Europe and Germany provide a useful background for understanding the preparations for a European Security Conference.
O.E.S.

MEMOIRS 1950-1963. BY GEORGE F. KENNAN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. 368 pages, annex and index, \$12.50.)

In this second volume of memoirs, George F. Kennan relates his experiences as Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952-1953) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963). The sections on Yugoslavia are particularly interesting in the light of Tito's recent efforts to tighten party discipline and improve relations with the Soviet Union.
A.Z.R.

AMERICAN POLICY AND THE DIVISION OF GERMANY. THE CLASH WITH RUSSIA OVER REPARATIONS. BY BRUCE KUKLICH. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. 283 pages and index, \$9.50.)

THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY: THE YUGOSLAV CASE, 1945-1953. BY A. ROSS JOHNSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973. 269 pages, bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

REVOLUTION ADMINISTERED: AGRARIAN-

ISM AND COMMUNISM IN BULGARIA. BY NISSAN OREN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973. 204 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.50 cloth, \$4.00 paper.)

AMERICA, ITALY AND THE BIRTH OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1917-1919. BY DRAGAN R. ZIVOJINOVIC. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 338 pages, sources, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

MISCELLANY

THE MORNING DELUGE: MAO TSETUNG AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 1893-1954. BY HAN SUYIN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. 571 pages and index, \$12.50.)

This romanticized biography of Mao Tse-tung and the history of modern China is highly readable, rich in insights, and packed with human vignettes of the key figures in the Chinese Communist drive to power. It glorifies Mao, but carries the reader along with its narrative treatment of Chinese history.
A.Z.R.

THE LONG MARCH TO POWER: A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1921-72. BY JAMES PINCKNEY HARRISON. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. 647 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$18.50.)

Students of the Chinese Communist movement will rejoice in this study. The author has brought together a vast body of information, integrating the vicissitudes of domestic turmoil and emergent nationalism with the personalities, rivalries and trials which brought the Chinese Communist party to power. A well organized, richly informative work.
A.Z.R.

TO PEKING—AND BEYOND: A REPORT ON THE NEW ASIA. BY HARRISON E. SALISBURY. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973. 308 pages and index, \$7.95.)

Harrison E. Salisbury of *The New York Times* tells of his recent visit to China with breathless enthusiasm. Most of the facts have already been widely reported, especially since President Richard Nixon's visit to Peking in February, 1972. A number of the anecdotes and observations are interesting.
A.Z.R.

PRINCIPLES OF WORLD POLITICS. BY GEORGE MODELSKI. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. 370 pages and index, \$10.95.)

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THE UNITED STATES AND EAST EUROPE

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difficulties, the United States may welcome the opportunity to acquire new markets for its exports.

All this indicates that the climate appears favorable for further détente between the United States and East Europe. Ultimate success or failure will depend on several factors. The state of American-Soviet relations, as reflected in the progress of current East-West negotiations at Geneva, Helsinki and Vienna, will obviously play a major role. Despite the rather astonishing pace of rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, there is still a good deal of suspicion on both sides and it may take several years before mutual trust is established. East Europe may well prove to be the touchstone of that trust.

If the United States persists in pursuing the *Realpolitik* of the last four years, based on the premise that "liberation" of East Europe is impossible in the foreseeable future, then it is up to the U.S.S.R. to respond. What the ultimate Soviet reaction will be it is difficult to say. Apart from the factors mentioned earlier (China; economic difficulties) one argument in favor of a benign attitude on the part of Moscow may be its perception of the continuing decline of American influence throughout the world, accompanied by a crisis at home and growing isolationism. Hence the new American approach to East Europe may be viewed by the Soviet regime as neither serious nor threatening. Moscow's indifference might also strengthen the West European conviction that there has been a real change in Soviet attitude. This, in turn, would make continuous European participation in NATO defense effort less and less necessary, culminating in what has been called the "Finlandization" of West Europe.

From the American point of view, at least for the next four years, the continuation of the new approach to East Europe will not depend on the reaction of the electorate. The administration's new policy toward East Europe was practically unopposed except, perhaps, by a few political refugee organizations. Judging from the election results, Americans of East European origin overwhelmingly supported the President, which means that on the domestic front the détente with East Europe is not going to encounter opposition.

The new policy has also been hailed as being more realistic and honest. At the same time, however, many observers believe that the United States must not pull back from West Europe and must not withdraw or even reduce its troop strength in Germany, since the presence of American troops has always had

a major psychological effect on the Europeans on both sides of the demarcation line.

Finally, a continuing American interest in East Europe was bound to be welcomed by East Europeans. Economic considerations aside, the revival of Washington's concern for the area meant that after more than two decades of being treated as an appendage of the Soviet Union, East Europe once again was about to assume its rightful place in the international arena. This process coincided with the gradual emergence in several countries of younger, pragmatic and nationalistic elites. It can be presumed that many of them thought that the American initiative as well as the European Security Conference and the MBFR negotiations would give them room for maneuver, an opportunity which has been denied them throughout the entire period of the cold war. While the new elites were realistic enough not to expect the breakup of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the opening of the hitherto closed system provided them with bargaining power vis-à-vis both the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

So far, the new elites have appeared in Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The replacement of Walter Ulbricht by Erich Honecker in East Germany and the Western recognition of East Germany as a separate state may have produced conditions encouraging similar developments in that country. There are some indications that the Czechoslovak regime may also be moving in a more pragmatic direction, leaving Bulgaria as the only East European ally of the Soviet Union refusing to change, at least for the time being.

The matrix—United States-U.S.S.R.-East Europe—may well yield a positive solution. Unless there is a sudden and unexpected change in the international atmosphere, we may yet witness a further dismantling of old barriers in Europe with the approval if not the blessing of Moscow and Washington.

POLAND

(Continued from page 201)

... This [Vietnamese] war cannot be justified any longer on logical grounds by any stretch of the imagination; it violates every rule of ethics.

Just a few days before, Poland's Foreign Minister Olszowski had visited Washington (September 17-18) where he saw Secretary of State William Rogers and President Richard Nixon.

Marked improvement in relations with the United States dates back to President Nixon's visit to Warsaw on May 31-June 1, 1972, where he was greeted by about 200,000 citizens. An agreement³² signed at

³² Text broadcast over Warsaw Radio, June 1, 1972.

that time provides for consulates in Kraków and New York. Soon, thereafter, a communiqué announced that trade between the United States and Poland would be expanded.³³ This was followed by a subsequent understanding to expand joint research in science and technology.³⁴

The United States Environmental Protection Agency began a \$2-million water pollution control program (about one-third of all water in Poland is unusable) in October, 1972, and the following month 15 American scientists arrived in Warsaw to advise on surface and thermal pollution in textile, petrochemical and mining industries. President Nixon decided to make available about \$150 million in Export-Import Bank credits to Poland.³⁵ This compares favorably with the \$100 million in credits given by the Soviet Union after the December, 1970, riots.

The changed American attitude toward Warsaw may be due in part to the fact that relations (with foreign policy overtones) between the regime and the Roman Catholic church appear to have become normalized, at least for the time being. The primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, reportedly protested to civil authorities the removal by 150 police of a makeshift chapel from a village near Warsaw.³⁶ However, since recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary by the Vatican through the appointment of six Polish bishops to the former German territories on June 28, 1972, church-state tension seems to have abated. In a sermon on Christmas Day in the cathedral at Warsaw, the primate expressed his hope that the American Episcopate "will do its best to end the shedding of blood of innocent children and brothers in Vietnam."³⁷

Poland continued active participation in the East European military alliance system at the June 6-9, 1972, conference of generals in Czechoslovakia to discuss combat preparedness. Polish troops were also among those from five pact member states that took part in "Shield '72" air-ground exercises during September 4-16 in that same country, allegedly to defend socialism's western border.³⁸

The political arm of the alliance convened at Moscow January 15-16, 1973, with foreign ministers of all seven member states in attendance to discuss a unified approach in the course of future East-West negotiations on mutual and balanced reduction of forces. This coordinating session resulted in "a friendly conversation on questions of further developing the cooperation of socialist countries on the international scene, including the strengthening of peace and security in Europe."³⁹

The other bloc-wide organization to which Poland belongs is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (C.M.E.A.) which announced a new committee for cooperation in planning in April, 1972.⁴⁰ This agency will coordinate fuel, power, and raw materials allocation. Polish industry remains dependent upon the Soviet Union for petroleum and iron ore. Premier Jaroszewicz attended the 26th C.M.E.A. session at Moscow in July, where joint economic development projects received approval for 1976-1980 implementation.⁴¹ During the current five-year-plan, Poland's trade with the U.S.S.R. should total some 60 per cent more than in 1966-1970. Fuel and energy requirements will increase by one-half over the current decade, which would make Polish dependence on Soviet deliveries even greater than they are today.⁴²

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The most important challenge facing Gierek is to place the economy on a sound footing. In order to do so, he has had to ignore some basic Marxist tenets. Apart from supporting individually owned farms, the new regime in Warsaw suspended liquidation of independent handicrafts and small-scale private entrepreneur trade.⁴³ These measures probably represent holding actions which may be reversed when, and if, the need for private enterprise to bolster the economy disappears.

The main problem, however, centers on the industrial worker and his attitude toward the government. Wildcat strikes throughout the country were meant as warnings to the regime, which reacted in October, 1972, by extending the price freeze for another year. In effect, Gierek has proclaimed that the goal of his administration is improvement in the living standard, as Gomulka had done before him. Herein lies the danger. Demands will increase as contacts with the West are expanded. However, these probably cannot be met because of obligations vis-à-vis other C.M.E.A. countries and because of deficiencies in the economic system.

Gierek has surrounded himself with a group of young and dynamic technocrats known as the "Silesian mafia," who had worked for him during his many years as first party secretary in that province. Unfortunately, this development has brought with it neither liberalization nor democratization. The

³³ *Ibid.*, August 2, 1972.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, October 31, 1972.

³⁵ *The New York Times*, November 4, 1972.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, April 1, 1972.

³⁷ "Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński Appeals for Peace in Vietnam," *Słowo powszechne* [Universal Word], December 30-31, 1972; January 1, 1973 (Warsaw).

³⁸ *The Guardian*, September 18, 1972 (London).

³⁹ *Tass* communiqué, January 17, 1973.

⁴⁰ *Pravda* [Truth], April 21, 1972 (Moscow).

⁴¹ Interview with *Literaturnaya gazeta* [Literary Gazette], July 19, 1972 (Moscow).

⁴² *East Europe*, XXI, no. 4 (April, 1972), p. 31; citing an article by M. Lashakov in *Vneshnyaya torgovlya* [Foreign Trade] (Moscow).

⁴³ W. Iwaszkiewicz, "What Faces the Handicraft Industry in the New Year," *Tygodnik demokratyczny* [Democratic Weekly], December 10, 1972 (Warsaw).

P.Z.P.R. has clamped down on all areas of society, to the extent that members of the second echelon under Gomulka are now returning to important party or government positions.⁴⁴

An interesting relationship exists between the Gierk regime and the industrial workers. The latter brought the new leadership into office and realize this full well. The dockyards, coal mines, textile factories and steel plants are filled with men and women cognizant of their power to effect change or at least to force the government to rescind arbitrary decisions. This situation is new to East Europe. If the delicate balance is maintained, through the exercise of restraint on both sides, it may continue over a long period of time.

On the other hand, should a new crisis develop, there is no way of predicting what may happen. Certainly Gierk would not hesitate to order riot police or even special troops against demonstrators, as Gomulka did before him. The problem is that no other Polish Communist leader of any national stature seems to be on the scene. Without such an alternative possibility, the Soviet Union would have only one course of action open in case of nation-wide disturbances: to intervene with its armed forces, as it did in Czechoslovakia. This latent threat may indeed dictate and preserve a *modus vivendi* between regime and population for some time to come.

⁴⁴ F. H. Neumann, "Augenschein an der Weichsel," *Deutsche Zeitung/Christ und Welt*, December 22, 1972 (Stuttgart).

WHITHER YUGOSLAVIA?

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and ideological situation in Yugoslavia is easy to understand. However, the manner in which Tito seeks to administer the cure raises legitimate concern about the patient's future.

A few comments are tentatively offered. First, setting aside the Croatian affair of December, 1971, which had unique characteristics, the purges of party organizations currently under way have one, possibly two, common threads: in all of them we see Tito's determination to bend republican party oligarchs to the will of the reconstituted, tightly-knit group around him; and in many cases liberally-oriented party officials are being purged by their republican and regional rivals. The latter seized on Tito's obstinate insistence on unquestioning acceptance of his formula for solving Yugoslavia's problems to settle accounts with their long-time opponents, in the name of Tito and his Action Program. In other words, the line between disagreements over concrete policies and bids for personal power is indistinct and difficult to ascertain in the Yugoslav setting.

Second, Yugoslavia is still without an established procedure for transferring power. Tito's institutional tinkering has forestalled the evolution of viable political institutions. At 81, Tito is very much in command. Relying on the support of the military, the secret police and his own palace staff, he has imposed his will on an indecisive and cowed party. On the governmental level, the State Presidency of Yugoslavia, which was created at Tito's behest in June, 1971, has no regular schedule of work or activities, and meets on an ad hoc basis. In the light of current political uncertainties, Tito's assumption that annual rotation of the post of President of Yugoslavia among the different nationality groups would stave off a succession struggle after his death is already anachronistic. The specter of instability in Yugoslavia after Tito heightens fears for the durability of peace in the Balkans and détente in Europe.

Third, economic considerations may impose some restraint on Tito's behavior. After exports to Common Market countries, the two most important sources of hard currency earnings for Yugoslavia are the remittances sent by the more than one million Yugoslavs who are employed abroad—primarily in West Europe—and the earnings from foreign tourists. Together, these two items account for upwards of \$1.1 billion a year: approximately \$700 million a year from remittances, and \$400 million from tourism. Given her chronic balance of payments deficit and her need to repay past debts to Western countries and the World Bank, Yugoslavia sorely needs these "invisible" earnings. Their continued inflow is linked to Yugoslavia remaining an "open society," in which Yugoslavs can freely go abroad to work or travel, in which they can buy apartments and homes, and in which they can purchase assorted luxury goods. The net impetus from these currency flows is to nudge Yugoslavia increasingly toward the West European international economic system. Any attempt to reimpose stringent and permanent controls on Yugoslav society would almost certainly have adverse consequences for this aspect of Yugoslav economic life. It is true that politics is in command in Yugoslavia, but perhaps it will be tempered in practice by the economics of the situation.

Finally, neither Yugoslavia nor the party can go back to 1952. Not even Tito can completely reverse 20 years of political, economic and social evolution. A new generation for whom the Partisan epic and ideological passions have little concrete meaning has come of political age. The values Tito cherishes and hopes to rekindle may or may not be appropriate in the 1970's. It is certain that an attempt to mandate a return to a rigid, highly centralized political system will not promote the Marxist values or advance the cause of workers' self-management to which Tito remains committed.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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work daily in 1971 and 4.0 per cent in 1972. The worker turnover remains high; some 20–25 per cent of the labor force change jobs each year.¹³

Massive pilfering from state enterprises of all sorts goes on unabated. As reported by *Rudé právo* on October 4, 1972, some 56,000 persons were tried for theft in 1971; and the number of those who were not caught is estimated to be considerably larger. Such abuses and deficiencies as charging private pleasure trips to official expense accounts (sharply criticized once again by Husák in his speech of November 29, 1972), wasting materials, fuel and energy, work stoppages caused by waiting for spare parts, supplies or repairs of broken down machinery, and plain laziness and sloppiness are widespread. Thus the key objective of Czechoslovakia's economic planners—to raise the overall quality and efficiency of their country's production to the levels prevalent in the advanced industrialized countries of the West—remains so far unattained.

OVERTURES TOWARD THE WEST

The recent lightening of the atmosphere at home has been paralleled by a noticeable moderation vis-à-vis the West. In fact, the two trends are two sides of one and the same coin; only if it tones down repression at home can the Husák regime hope to improve its image abroad. Moreover, since the new Communist stance toward the United States and the West has been initiated by the Kremlin itself, falling into line has become a highly commendable exercise in the correct kind of "proletarian internationalism" and an act of fraternal cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The most conspicuous manifestations of this new trend have been the various signals of studied affability beamed toward the United States. A group of United States senators who visited Czechoslovakia at the end of November, 1972, was extended a most cordial welcome; the red-carpet treatment included a talk with Husák himself. Some American correspondents who had been previously banned, like Eric Bourne of the *Christian Science Monitor*, have once again begun to receive visas and have even been able to interview high-ranking Communist officials.¹⁴ As reported from several sources, the Husák regime

appears anxious all of a sudden to enter into negotiations about the hitherto deadlocked issue of compensation for American-owned properties nationalized after World War II, paving the way for increased trade with the United States and gaining access to American technology.

There have also been signs of a possible modification of Prague's stand regarding the Munich agreement of 1938. In the protracted Czechoslovak-West German negotiations about the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Czechoslovak government has adamantly insisted that West Germany must declare the Munich agreement to have been null and void *from its very beginning* (*ab initio*). On the other hand, the West German government, while willing to declare that the agreement was morally unjust and legally invalid, has consistently refused to go along with the clause "from its very beginning," evidently fearing that this might open a Pandora's box of complex and probably insoluble legal problems.

But the Czechoslovak government is apparently preparing for some sort of compromise. In his speech of November 29, 1972, Husák called only for a clear and unequivocal dissociation of Germany from the Munich *Diktat*, without raising the controversial "*ab initio*" issue. In an interview in the *Washington Post* of December 17, 1972, the Czechoslovak Premier, Lubomír Štrougal, appeared to be hopeful that a solution acceptable to both sides would soon be found. Nor does it seem to be a mere coincidence that recent international Communist documents, like the Soviet-Bulgarian communiqué published after the visit of the Bulgarian Premier to Moscow in November, 1972, and the Soviet-Hungarian communiqué issued after Soviet party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Hungary on December 1, 1972, urged West Germany to declare the Munich agreement null and void without any mention of the "*ab initio*" requirement which invariably appeared in earlier Communist statements.¹⁵

CEAUSESCHISM: RUMANIA'S ROAD TO COMMUNISM

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go to Rumania. The stumbling block, in fact, has never been anti-Americanism in Rumania but, rather, uncritical pro-Americanism. Somehow the American brand of chewing gum is supposed to taste better, the third-rate jazz band to sound "jazzier"; and the late-show cowboy Western far more dramatic, even though the latter's voices are dubbed in Spanish. Rumanian intellectuals crave United States recognition, a trend bitterly denounced by Ceaușescu.

This feverish promotion of internationalism cannot

¹³ "The Fluctuation Costs Us Billions," *Hospodárské noviny*, No. 35, September 1, 1972.

¹⁴ See, for instance, the interview of the correspondent of the *Washington Post* with the Czechoslovak Premier, *Washington Post*, December 17, 1972.

¹⁵ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, November 18, 1972, and The Radio Free Europe report *Czechoslovakia/43*, December 6, 1972.

be discarded merely as opportunism; its obvious aim is to reduce international tensions and to make the world safer for peace. "I have called a new world into existence, to redress the balance of the old," said George Canning well over a century ago in recognizing the Latin American states, which had revolted against Spain. Ceaușescu's "new world" is not the Balkans, although he constantly reminds his listeners that, given her geographical situation, Rumania naturally desires special relationships with the Balkan countries and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in that area. Nor is the "new world" Europe, a fact which (given Rumania's "love affair" with Latin cultures) is particularly meaningful. Ceaușescu's championship of a conference on European security (which has recently opened at Helsinki) has represented a leitmotiv in his speeches on foreign policy since 1963. The "new world" the Rumanian leader has called into existence is composed of the small and middle-sized states of Europe, Asia and Africa which speak with the moral strength of disinterestedness in the face of great power diplomacy. The Rumanians believe that peace and survival in the atomic age no longer depend on an outdated European Concert which has dominated European diplomacy from the days of Metternich to those of his most admiring contemporary practitioner, Henry Kissinger. Since Nasser's death and in view of an aging Tito, Ceaușescu may have earned for himself the title of spiritual leader of a third force. Bucharest may well be the place that most effectively mends bridges and promotes international good will. Although history has yet to reach a verdict on the precise contribution of Rumania, there can be no question that Ceaușescu was involved in the initial stages of the Nixon trip to China.

A more revolutionary aspect of Rumania's foreign policy which has captured headlines since her bold denunciation of Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia is the pursuance of a new diplomacy governing the relationship of states within the Communist bloc. Inside this world, superstatism, whether military, political or economic, should be as outdated as Big Power summitry. The Rumanians hope that by friendly debate in which socialist states, large and small may participate (but need not feel compelled to do so), a new harmony will emerge, based on respect for sovereignty and for differences in socialist interpretation. It is clear that this harmony is still in the making.

The inevitable question so often asked with regard to Ceaușescu's defiant attitude toward Moscow is: "how does he get away with it?" Several answers are given. There is, of course, a distant Chinese um-

brella on the Siberian frontier. Within the country, the nation has been in arms since 1968. There is occasional verbal subservience to Moscow and tokenism in matters of etiquette (Rumania has recently participated in Warsaw Pact army maneuvers). All these explanations contain a grain of truth. The basic answer, however, must be sought elsewhere. Although recognizing *de facto* and *de jure* coexistence with Western capitalist states, Rumania has not abandoned socialist militancy and ideological combativeness. She supports all the progressive revolutionary forces across the world—feminists, the youth movement, radical religious and peace groups, not just Communist parties. Rumania may trade with Spain, but Ceaușescu will propose a toast in honor of the aging La Passionaria, condemning Franco's tyranny.⁹ There are almost as many "unofficial" meets in Bucharest honoring radical causes as there are "official" cultural and economic conferences. On this score, it is plausible that Ceaușescu is a more sincere Marxist than Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev, and it is equally conceivable that the Soviets know it.

In the light of the experience of the last five years, one might finally suggest that the Soviets may have accepted the simplicity of the logic of Rumania's voice in foreign affairs for one good reason: Ceaușescu's diplomacy *works* and what sounded hopefully prophetic in 1965 has either been realized or is well on its way toward implementation. Recognition of the two Germanies and of the Eastern frontier, Chinese entry into the United Nations, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, summoning a European security conference, the end of the war in Vietnam, the dismantling of military blocks, détente in the Middle East, and the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Balkans are Rumanian themes which have been repeated at all the international conferences during the last decade.

In conclusion, it may be difficult to describe Rumania's complex course at home and abroad under a single rubric. Most of the "isms" coined by the experts so far are either ambiguous or incomplete. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the Rumanian approach to communism deserves a label. We already have Titoism for Yugoslavia, Castroism for Cuba, Maoism for China. Why not adopt Ceauseschism? The man's personal philosophy sufficiently imposes itself upon Rumania's eclectic application of communism to earn him that title, in spite of its mischievous but innocent ending.

ERRATUM: On page 242 of his article "Our Indochina War" in our December, 1972, issue, Mr. Clubb by inadvertence assigned to President Nixon a quotation on the tactics of dealing with Asian subversion that should properly have been attributed to Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan, speaking in 1964. Mr. Clubb regrets the error.

⁹ Speech delivered in honor of Dolores Ibarruri, chairman of the Communist party of Spain, on her 75th birthday, December 21, 1970.

EUROPEAN SECURITY

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If the Yugoslavs agree with the Poles (as they clearly do) that this indirect formulation potentially improves their bargaining position with Moscow in the event of future tensions, their opinions should not be lightly disregarded—either with regard to the general declaration or on the question of specific “confidence building measures” that have been suggested, such as an exchange of observers during NATO and Warsaw Pact maneuvers.

4. Opinions about permanent machinery for the CSCE are conflicting. The Americans, who to some extent still view the European security conference as a sop to their European allies (made necessary by the American desire for MBFR negotiations), have virtually no enthusiasm for permanent bodies which might grow out of the initial set of negotiations. As one skeptical member of the American political elite put it, “One conference, and a short one at that, is the best we can expect.” West Europeans who—partly by virtue of being European—view CSCE as part of a process of community building within Europe are more prone to favor some form of institutionalization. Suggestions range from periodic conferences with working groups established to deal with concrete issues between conferences to the establishment of a more general European security commission.

The East Europeans have on the whole been even more interested than Moscow in seeing CSCE institutionalized, because this would increase their options for independent policy maneuvers in Europe. Here, as on so many issues, Yugoslavia stands apart. The Yugoslavs believe that any institutions set up now would reflect those bloc divisions of Europe they find anathema. Therefore, the Yugoslavs believe that minimal institutionalization, perhaps in the form of period conferences, is the best halfway house between CSCE as a one-shot deal and permanent machinery where Yugoslavs would be at a considerable disadvantage.

The Soviet leaders themselves, although nominally in favor of permanent bodies, may have been having second thoughts. After all, much of what they wanted from a European security conference—recognition of the territorial status quo on the continent—was achieved bilaterally even before the preliminary CSCE talks began. That CSCE as a process may undermine their political status quo in East Europe is a possibility the Soviet leaders would find awkward to admit publicly, but they are evidently acutely aware of it. So, paradoxically, the gap between the positions of Moscow and Washington appears to be narrowing. Realizing the danger of open-ended dialogue, the Soviets may also prefer one short conference.

MBFR CONFERENCES

As for the conferences on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR), these are currently the touchiest of negotiating forums. There has been considerable and sometimes intense debate on the relationship of MBFR to CSCE. The Americans have adamantly insisted on complete separation of the two, even to the extent of overriding a reportedly strong feeling among the smaller NATO allies that the two sets of negotiations should be held in the same city to allow for informal contacts among the negotiators. The Soviet leaders also have reasons for thinking that in bloc-to-bloc negotiations their control over their East European allies is more secure. France and Yugoslavia, the odd men out at this time in such a format, have in principle opposed bloc-to-bloc talks without the representation of neutral and nonaligned nations.

As in the case of the CSCE, MBFR is currently in the stage of talks about talks. In the case of MBFR, preliminary discussions opened in Vienna at the end of January, with 12 NATO states and 7 Warsaw Pact states participating. The NATO position is that participants should be limited to those countries having troops in central Europe. Moscow, perhaps partly due to pressure from Bucharest, is trying to see that nations on its southern flank, i.e., Rumania and Bulgaria, take part also. There was even a suggestion by the Soviet leaders in their note of January 24, 1973, that not only these additional Warsaw Pact countries but also neutral Sweden and nonaligned Yugoslavia should participate.

Once the issue of who will participate is settled, however, the issue of what will be settled is even stickier with respect to MBFR than CSCE. The West has consistently held out for “balanced” reductions, on the grounds that geographical factors (it is much easier for Soviet troops to return if they go home) in addition to the uneven nature of military capacity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces make simple parity impossible. Moscow has agreed to discuss “mutual” reductions; but Soviet leaders strenuously reject the notion that such reductions will of necessity be balanced.

CONCLUSION

Slowly, rather like a troika of turtles, the talks on European security go on. Their effect on future strategic and political security arrangements in Europe depends very much on the attitudes developed in the process of talking; at this stage this remains largely unpredictable. That such negotiations are under way at all is due to a shift in attitude on the part of the superpowers, a shift that experts would have thought unthinkable five years ago. If Soviet and American attitudes continue to move in the direction of asking

not "what can we manage not to lose" but, rather, "what can be gained?" new relationships may well be formed across the dividing line of the two European alliance structures.

Symbolic changes and modest agreements have their own importance. The process of these talks will have a political effect; the question of direction in large measure depends on whether the participants know what they want. Do we? In President Nixon's era of negotiation, does the administration know what it is negotiating for or only whom it is negotiating against.

HUNGARY IN THE SEVENTIES

(Continued from page 219)

example, a novel entitled, *Like a Leaf in the Storm*, was recalled after publication.¹⁰ The volume, written by Endrek Sik (one of the most orthodox Communists, a former Comintern official and once a Foreign Minister of Hungary), deals with the sensitive subject of Stalin's purges in the 1930's. Another volume, *The Inquest*, written by former People's Commissar Jozsef Lengyel, was published only in a limited edition and stamped "For Internal Use Only." The common aspects of these two works and the reason for their censure lies in the implied criticism of the Soviet Union under Stalin. Thus it seems clear that one may not even write about the most glaring mistakes of the U.S.S.R. This is one of the major tenets of Kádár's policy, which can best be summed up as "No publicity, slow improvements and unquestioning verbal support of the U.S.S.R. in foreign affairs." These are the prices that had to be paid for the better life the citizenry of Hungary can expect to live today. For most Hungarians, it is an acceptable price.

The key to further improvements in Hungary thus lies only partially in the policies followed by Hungary's leaders; these improvements can only occur if no great pressure to stop domestic liberalization comes from the Soviet Union. Kádár and his followers look forward to a growing détente between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. That détente, perhaps within the framework of a new European security system, would undoubtedly give grudging international acceptance to the harsh reality that Hungary lies within the Soviet sphere of influence; it would thus end Soviet uneasiness about Hungary's relations with the West. By profiting from improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and its Western European allies, Hungary can move cautiously forward to improve her own contacts with the Western powers. The existence of a détente would give the Hungarian leaders greater flexibility and would allow Hungarians to seek additional ways of reintegrating Hungary with the European community.

¹⁰ *Vihar a levelet*. . . (Budapest: Zrinyi, 1970).

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 225)

The author of this stimulating text on world politics is interested in focusing attention on the structures and processes necessary to create a stable world order. The book is readable, well organized, and rich in suggestive ideas. It should find a wide audience in college courses.

A.Z.R.

INTERNATIONAL CRISES: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. Edited by CHARLES F. HERMANN. (New York: The Free Press, 1973. 334 pages, appendix and index, \$12.95.)

This book is a compilation of some of the key essays written on international crises by behaviorally oriented specialists. It is strong on theory, simulation and modeling.

A.Z.R.

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. By MAX SILBERSCHMIDT. (New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1973. 216 pages, illustrations and index, \$6.95.)

MARXISM AND THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH SOCIALISM. THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW CONSCIOUSNESS. By STANLEY PIERSON. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973. 290 pages and index, \$10.75.)

BRITAIN AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970's. By SHERWOOD S. CORDIER. (Jericho, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1973. 63 pages, appendices, notes, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

EUROPE AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. Edited by SIMA LIEBERMAN. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Corporation, 1972. 475 pages, \$9.95, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WESTERN EUROPEAN UNITY. By R. B. MANDERSON-JONES. (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1972. 168 pages, notes and index, \$11.95.)

THE SPANIARDS: HOW THEY LIVE AND WORK. By MICHAEL PERCEVAL. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. 192 pages, photographs, and index, \$6.50.)

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. By MOSE L. HARVEY, LEON GOURE AND VLADIMIR PROKOFIEFF. (Miami: University of Miami, 1972. 219 pages and index, \$5.95.)

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of March, 1973, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Mar. 12—A second round of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiations resumes in Geneva after a two and one-half month recess.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *Monetary Crisis*)

Mar. 13—Dutch liberal Cornelis Berkhouwer is elected president of the assembly of the EEC, known as the European Parliament.

Mar. 21—Trade negotiations between the EEC and the U.S. open in Geneva.

Middle East

Mar. 1—United States Ambassador to the Sudan Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and George C. Moore, the U.S. chargé d'affairs in Khartoum, are captured by Black September guerrillas in Khartoum. The Americans and three other diplomats are being held as hostages pending the release of several hundred Arab prisoners, including the murderer of Robert F. Kennedy.

Mar. 3—The Sudanese government reports that yesterday Black September guerrillas shot and killed Cleo Noel, Jr., George C. Moore, and the Belgian chargé d'affairs in Khartoum.

Mar. 4—Eight Black September guerrillas end their siege of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, yielding to Sudanese troops. The bodies of the 3 slain diplomats are surrendered.

Mar. 6—Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry charges that the chief of the Khartoum office of the Palestinian commando organization Al Fatah was the head planner of the raid on the Saudi Arabian embassy.

Mar. 7—Nimeiry informs the Arab League that all Palestine guerrilla activity in the Sudan has been banned.

Mar. 12—*Al Sahafa*, a government-controlled newspaper in Khartoum, reports that a 3-man judiciary commission has decided to seek an indictment including a premeditated murder charge against the Black Septemberists who killed the foreign diplomats March 2.

Monetary Crisis

Mar. 1—In Frankfurt, London, Brussels, Amsterdam,

Vienna and Tokyo, foreign exchange markets are ordered to close tomorrow, following unprecedented speculation in gold and the devaluation of the U.S. dollar on February 12 for the second time in 14 months.

Mar. 9—In a 500-word communiqué, the U.S. offers to help the nations of the EEC "insure jointly an orderly exchange rate system"; the communiqué follows a 9-hour meeting of the finance ministers and central bank governors of the major non-Communist states.

Mar. 12—Six nations of the EEC—West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Denmark—decide to float their currencies jointly in relation to the U.S. dollar. British and Italian currencies continue to float independently.

Mar. 13—The governor of the bank of Japan announces that Japan will support the joint float of the EEC nations.

Mar. 14—West German Chancellor Willy Brandt announces that the value of the mark will henceforth be fixed in relation to Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund instead of to the dollar.

Mar. 16—Meeting in Paris, the U.S. and 13 other nations agree on a number of measures to ameliorate the difficulty of excess dollars abroad and assure the orderly reopening of official currency dealings.

Mar. 19—Official foreign exchange trading resumes.

Mar. 27—The finance ministers and central-bank governors of 20 nations negotiating international monetary reform agree "in principle" that the world's monetary system should be "based on stable but adjustable" currency values; floating exchange rates are to be allowed in "particular situations."

United Nations

Mar. 2—A group of American Indians who have seized the hamlet of Wounded Knee in South Dakota ask the U.N. to send observers there to protect them. (See also *U.S., Government*.)

Mar. 15—At the opening session of the 5-day U.N. Security Council meeting in Panama, Panamanian General Omar Torrijos Herrera, Panama's Chief of Government, charges that the U.S. is engaged in neocolonialism in the Canal Zone.

Mar. 21—The U.S. vetoes a Security Council resolution asking the U.S. to conclude a treaty with Pan-

ama ceding sovereignty of the Canal Zone to Panama.

War in Indochina

Mar. 2—At the close of a 5-day international conference in Paris, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China and 9 other parties sign a formal declaration pledging to respect the cease-fire agreement in Vietnam.

Mar. 4—The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam resumes; a naval minesweeping force returns to its position off Haiphong. Troop withdrawal and minesweeping operations were halted during a delay in the freeing of American prisoners of war. (See "War in Indochina," *Current History*, April, 1973, p. 187.)

A second large group of American prisoners of war arrives at Clark Air Base after being released by North Vietnam. 242 American prisoners have been released.

Mar. 6—Cambodian President Lon Nol says that he is prepared to talk in Phnompenh or elsewhere with representatives of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong on the subject of foreign troop withdrawals and prisoner exchanges.

A Pathet Lao (Communist) spokesman says the U.S. and the Laotian government are sabotaging the cease-fire agreement for Laos reached February 22. The Vientiane government and the Pathet Lao hold their 21st weekly negotiating session; the atmosphere is reportedly "cordial" despite Pathet Lao charges.

Mar. 8—The South Vietnamese and the Communists reach an agreement on the next exchange of Vietnamese prisoners of war—part of the 2d phase of prisoner exchanges.

In Washington, representatives of the U.S. and North Vietnam announce that a joint commission to discuss U.S. aid for reconstruction in North Vietnam will meet for the first time in Paris in a week.

Mar. 13—In protest against a delay in releasing American prisoners, the U.S. again halts troop withdrawals temporarily.

Mar. 14—American troop withdrawals resume. 108 more American prisoners of war are released.

Mar. 15—The Cambodian command says government troops have pushed the fighting front line 18 miles south of Phnompenh.

The U.S. army command in Saigon is discontinued; 6,800 U.S. troops still in Vietnam are under U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam.

U.S. President Richard Nixon warns Hanoi not to "lightly disregard" his warning that North Vietnam should not move military equipment toward South Vietnam in violation of the cease-fire agreement.

Canadian Minister of External Affairs Mitchell W. Sharp arrives in Saigon on a trip to see whether

Canada should continue as a member of the 4-nation International Commission of Control and Supervision. He voices Canadian dissatisfaction with the way the I.C.C.S. is working.

Mar. 16—The chief Vietcong delegate to the Joint Military Commission charges that the U.S. is sending war material into South Vietnam in violation of the cease-fire.

U.S. sources in Washington charge that the North Vietnamese have sent hundreds of artillery pieces and more than 300 tanks down the Ho Chi Minh trail toward South Vietnam.

Mar. 19—In Paris, representatives of the South Vietnamese government in Saigon and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) begin negotiations on the political future of South Vietnam.

Mar. 20—I.C.C.S. field teams begin to investigate charges of cease-fire violations.

U.S. intelligence agents report a "significant reduction" in North Vietnamese military movement toward South Vietnam.

Mar. 21—It is reported from Phnompenh that the Communists have cut 2 principal supply routes to Cambodia's capital.

Mar. 22—The military command in Saigon reports that the government has launched a major "relief operation" to relieve a small outpost under attack by Communist forces.

Mar. 24—In Phnompenh, a senior official source declares that the Cambodian government has refused a Communist offer to negotiate provided that President Lon Nol is excluded.

Mar. 26—Vietcong and Saigon representatives fail to agree on an agenda for a conference on national elections, in their 3d meeting.

Mar. 29—The last U.S. combat forces leave South Vietnam. The remaining American prisoners of war are released by Hanoi.

In Cambodia, U.S. B-52's continue to bomb suspected Communist concentrations near Phnompenh.

U.S. President Nixon threatens the North Vietnamese that "they should have no doubt of the consequences if they fail to comply" with all the terms of the cease-fire in South Vietnam.

7,200 civilian employees of the U.S. Department of Defense stay in Saigon under the senior defense attaché there. The former U.S. combat operations center in Saigon, now called the readiness room, continues to operate in constant communication with the new U.S. combat center in Nakorn Phanom, Thailand, the new headquarters of the U.S. Seventh Air Force.

Mar. 31—As their role in the Joint Military Commission ends, the North Vietnamese charge that the Saigon government, encouraged by the U.S., is vio-

lating the terms of the cease-fire. The U.S. also withdraws from the commission as scheduled. The Saigon government and the Vietcong remain in a 2-party commission.

ARGENTINA

Mar. 12—Peronist Héctor J. Cámpora wins the election for President with close to half the votes from 90 per cent of those eligible to vote. The Peronists and their supporters also appear to have a majority in the National Congress, provincial and municipal posts.

Mar. 13—President-elect Cámpora indicates his intention to visit former President Juan Domingo Perón in Madrid, insisting on Perón's presence when he takes over the government May 25. The ruling military junta has forbidden his return before then.

Mar. 21—In La Plata, government troops arrest striking policemen, part of an armed revolt of about 5,000 policemen. In 3 other cities police continue to strike for more pay.

Mar. 22—President-elect Dr. Cámpora accuses the military government of delaying the announcement of the election results, as the government conducts a recount because of a computer breakdown; the results will affect only the composition of the National Congress and other elective posts.

BANGLADESH

Mar. 8—Prime Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahman wins a large personal victory as his party, the Awami League, captures a vast majority of the 300 seats of Parliament.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Mar. 4—The government closes the largest popular newspaper, *Koh Santepheap*, charging a breach of national security.

Mar. 14—President Lon Nol orders government preparation for a general legislative election without specifying a date, in a political effort to reconcile non-Communist opponents.

Mar. 17—An Air Force captain bombing the presidential palace kills at least 20 people in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Lon Nol. The unharmed President declares a state of national emergency, suspending all civil rights and imposing a 9 p.m. curfew.

Mar. 18—The President suspends all non-government publications, puts several members of the former royal family under house arrest and orders striking teachers back to work.

Mar. 20—The government arrests newspaper editors in addition to opposition politicians, student leaders and journalists who are either under house arrest or jailed.

Mar. 22—The government acknowledges that former Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak is under guard but only for his protection.

CANADA

(See *Intl, War in Indochina; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

CHILE

(See also *U.S., Labor and Industry*)

Mar. 5—Legislative elections indicate gains for the Marxist government of President Salvador Allende Gossens but continue the stalemate condition of an Opposition majority.

Mar. 27—President Salvador Allende Gossens accepts the resignation of 3 military members of his Cabinet.

CHINA

(See also *Japan; Spain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 1—China offers to negotiate directly with the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan. The offer is refused.

Mar. 8—*Hsinhua* reports that China and the Soviet Union have failed to reach an accord on navigation in boundary rivers in a conference concluding today.

Mar. 10—Senior editor Frank Uhlig, Jr., of the United States Naval Institute's official publication *Sea Power*, ranks China's navy third, after the United States and the Soviet Union.

CUBA

Mar. 8—Cuba and Mexico sign a trade agreement, Cuba's first with a Latin American country since a U.S. trade embargo of October, 1960. Cuba is to sell nickel, and Mexico, beans.

CYPRUS

Mar. 25—Officials indicate the discovery of a secret plot led by General George Grivas to overthrow Archbishop Makarios and to unite Cyprus with Greece.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mar. 22—General Ludvik Svoboda wins unanimous endorsement by the Federal Assembly in an election for a second 5-year term and takes the oath of office as President.

EGYPT

Mar. 26—At a private joint meeting of the People's Assembly and the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, President Anwar Sadat announces that he is taking over as Premier, replacing Aziz Sidky. In a radio address he states a policy of military buildup and diplomatic effort for a negotiated settlement with Israel.

Mar. 27—President Sadat names his Cabinet, retaining his foreign, defense and interior ministers, add-

ing 2 generals, and appointing the former Minister of the Treasury to Deputy Premier in charge of the treasury and the economy.

Mar. 28—President Sadat names himself military governor of Egypt; he can declare martial law.

FRANCE

Mar. 7—The French government begins negotiations with air controllers whose strike has reduced air traffic to 5 per cent of normal.

Mar. 11—The final round of legislative elections gives the Gaullist-led government a five-year mandate, with a majority in the new Assembly.

Mar. 27—Government sources acknowledge that France may furnish Uganda with parts for French-built military planes but deny selling that country armored troop carriers.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Mar. 8—East Germany halts the return of at least 1,000 young people who were to join their parents in the West, indicating they will delay the family-reunion program until after the treaty to establish formal relations between the two Germanys, concluded last December, takes effect. The two Parliaments are scheduled to ratify the treaty in May.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*)

Mar. 28—The Cabinet approves the draft of a bill reforming marriage laws, giving a woman the right to work, equalizing names, support costs, and rights to pensions in the case of divorced couples.

GREECE

(See also *Cyprus*)

Mar. 11—The government, the Orthodox Church, and political opponents express their support of Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus.

Mar. 20—Police break up a sit-in of 800 students demanding greater academic liberties at the Athens University Law School; they injure many students and onlookers.

Mar. 26—Athens University students agree to negotiate with university authorities, ending an 8-week strike.

HUNGARY

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

INDIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 27—A Communist party demonstration by an estimated 200,000 persons protests rising prices and increasing unemployment.

INDONESIA

Mar. 22—The People's Consultative Congress reelects

President Suharto unanimously for a new 5-year term.

Mar. 27—President Suharto forms a new 22-man Cabinet.

IRAN

Mar. 16—The Shah reveals that Western oil companies have "surrendered totally," giving "full control" to Iran for the operation of the oil industry.

IRAQ

Mar. 20—Iraqi and Kuwaiti troops clash at the border of the 2 countries.

IRELAND

Mar. 14—Liam Cosgrave takes office as Prime Minister, naming a Cabinet of which 11 members belong to his Fine Gael party and 5 are members of the Labor party.

Mar. 29—The Navy intercepts a ship carrying 5 tons of arms for the Irish Republican Army.

ISRAEL

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 13—Israel approves the establishment of a Palestinian Arab university on the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Mar. 14—Prime Minister Golda Meir offers King Hussein of Jordan guardianship of the Islamic shrines in Jerusalem's Old City.

JAPAN

Mar. 3—The government discloses its first postwar military plan to defend the nation in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union or China.

Mar. 7—Premier Kakuei Tanaka proposes to Soviet Communist party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev the reopening of negotiations on a peace treaty and the joint economic development of Siberia.

Mar. 27—Ambassador Chen Chu of China arrives in Tokyo and Ambassador Heishiro Ogawa of Japan will leave for Peking, in the countries' first exchange of envoys.

JORDAN

(See also *Israel*)

Mar. 14—King Hussein commutes the death sentences of 16 Al Fatah Palestinian guerrillas and their leader, Mohammed Daoud Odeh, better known as Abu Daoud, who were convicted of plotting subversion.

KOREA (South)

Mar. 1—President Chung Hee Park's Democratic Republican party wins half of the National Assembly's contested seats, 73; these elected members, plus 73 members to be appointed under the new constitution, give Park a two-thirds majority in the 219-seat legislature.

Mar. 9—North and South Korea announce simultaneously the resumption of political discussions next week and meetings by their Red Cross organizations to help Korean families separated by the border.

LAOS

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Mar. 5—Delegates from the Vientiane government and the Communist-led Pathet Lao discuss the formation of a new coalition government and peace-keeping procedures.

LIBYA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

MAURITANIA

Mar. 24—Mauritania and Zaire sign a pact for technical, economic and cultural cooperation and agree to exchange ambassadors.

MEXICO

(See *Cuba*)

MOROCCO

Mar. 10—The government announces the nationalization of foreign-owned agricultural land, affecting 2,000 landholders.

PAKISTAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Mar. 24—Following yesterday's armed clashes, the coalition party opposing President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announces that it will boycott the drafting of a new constitution.

PANAMA

(See *Intl, United Nations*)

PHILIPPINES

Mar. 13—Military authorities give total casualties as at least 187 Muslim rebels, 27 government soldiers and 27 civilians dead, in two weeks of fighting in Cotabato Province.

RHODESIA

Mar. 17—Two rival nationalist organizations, the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union, banned in Rhodesia, agree to set up a political council and revive a defunct joint military command after 4 days of meeting in neighboring Zambia.

Mar. 26—The government indicates it plans to set up regional authorities or "Bantustans" for the administration of black African areas. The plan was attacked yesterday by the African National Council, a black opposition group.

SAN MARINO

Mar. 20—A new coalition forms a Cabinet, ending the republic's 2-month crisis.

SPAIN

Mar. 1—Deputy Premier Luis Carrero Blanco instructs the National Council to recommend "concrete measures to widen citizen participation in public tasks" in 7 areas such as education, regionalism, foreign relations and relations between church and state.

Mar. 9—The government announces the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and China.

SWEDEN

Mar. 28—At a news conference, Premier Olof Palme presents proposals for a new constitution, retaining the King as chief of state without residual powers, lowering the voting age from 19 to 18, and guaranteeing citizens the right to demonstrate.

SYRIA

Mar. 13—Syria's first permanent constitution is approved by 97.6 per cent of the voters.

TURKEY

Mar. 25—The Senate defeats a constitutional amendment to extend the term of President Cevdet Sunay. The Assembly voted it down last week by 1 vote. Sunay's 7-year term ends Mar. 28 and by law he cannot succeed himself.

UGANDA

(See *France*)

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Japan*)

Mar. 1—The Soviet Union launches unmanned satellite Cosmos 550, referred to in the West as a military reconnaissance craft.

Mar. 20—The Export-Import Bank announces that the Soviet Union will receive a \$202.4-million loan for the purchase of American industrial equipment; a 7-year, \$50-million Euroloan for Western machinery and equipment for socialist countries is also announced.

Mar. 21—*The New York Times* reports that Soviet sources indicate a waiver of the tax on emigrants with higher education affecting some 60 Jewish families; the American Embassy has no official confirmation of its suspension.

The Soviet Union launches the unmanned satellite Cosmos 552.

UNITED KINGDOM

Bermuda

Mar. 10—The Governor, Sir Richard Sharples, and

his aide de camp, Captain Hugh Sayers, are assassinated.

Great Britain

Mar. 1—Labor's "strike-a-day" protest against the government freeze on wages causes hospitals to send home thousands of patients and handle only emergency cases. The effect of the gas workers' 2-week strike causes severe shortages and the closing of many unheated schools.

Mar. 5—The Trades Union Congress, representing more than 10 million workers, votes for a day of nation-wide strikes to protest the government's program to fight inflation.

Mar. 6—The Conservative government proposes what it calls a "neutral" budget, relying on tax cuts and the business incentives of previous years to ensure faster growth without feeding inflation.

Mar. 8—Two bombings strike London; officials believe they were timed as an I.R.A. protest against the referendum in Northern Ireland.

Mar. 9—Thousands of trains are cancelled following yesterday's nation-wide rail strike. Non-medical hospital workers continue their work stoppage.

Mar. 16—Leaders of the locomotive engineers' union vote to suspend strikes, in a 5-4 decision.

Queen Elizabeth opens a new London Bridge, the third one in a thousand years.

Mar. 20—In a white paper, the government proposes to ensure a share of political power for the Roman Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. The long-awaited plan provides for the election of an 80-seat Assembly giving a half million Catholics a fair share of seats along with the million Protestants and an executive group of assembly committee chairmen to include Catholics to run such departments as education, housing and health. The government in London would retain responsibility for law and order and the police.

Mar. 23—The gas workers vote to end their strike, obtaining an extra \$7 a week without breaching government wage limitations.

Northern Ireland

Mar. 9—The results of yesterday's referendum are announced: 59,820 votes for Ulster's remaining in the United Kingdom and 6,463 votes for her union with the Irish Republic.

Mar. 14—British Secretary of State for Ulster William Whitelaw proposes local government elections in Ulster on May 30 under a new system of proportional representation.

Mar. 22—The Ulster Catholic Social Democratic and Labor party in a statement on the white paper indicates it will participate in elections for the new Assembly; it calls the abolition of the old Northern Ireland Parliament "a major step forward."

Mar. 23—The militant Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army announces in Dublin its intention to continue fighting in a rebuff to the British constitutional proposals for Northern Ireland.

Mar. 27—The Unionist party, representing the Protestant majority, votes to hold discussions with the British to negotiate the British proposals.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Mar. 8—The Justice Department appeals a federal district court ruling requiring the government to withhold funds from school systems in 17 states which are violating civil rights laws.

Mar. 21—U.S. District Court Judge Charles R. Richey quashes efforts by the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President to compel 10 reporters and news executives to turn over unpublished material in the Watergate case. (See also *Government*.)

Mar. 29—Twenty-five school districts in 12 states are ordered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to submit new plans for school desegregation by April 10 or risk losing federal funds.

Economy

Mar. 6—The administration places the country's 23 largest oil companies under price controls again, limiting rises to 1 per cent.

Mar. 21—The Labor Department reports that the Consumer Price Index for February showed the largest one-month increase in 22 years, particularly in higher food prices. Retail food costs are up 2.4 per cent, with meat alone up 5.4 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See *Intl, EEC, Middle East, Monetary Crisis*)

Mar. 2—President Nixon states that postwar aid to North Vietnam, if approved by Congress, will cause no further cuts in the domestic budget but will come from current defense and foreign aid funds.

Mar. 3—The United States and Canada sign a Great Lakes safety agreement.

Mar. 5—The Treasury Department announces that Secretary George P. Schultz will represent the United States at the Paris monetary talks, accompanied by Arthur F. Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and Paul A. Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treasury for monetary affairs.

Mar. 6—The United States and Hungary sign an agreement settling claims for American property damaged in World War II and nationalized in Hungary and pledging the release of Hungarian accounts frozen in the U.S. within 30 days.

Mar. 13—It is reported from Washington that an agreement was made with Israeli Premier Golda

Meir earlier this month to sell Israel 4 squadrons of combat jets and to assist in the production of an Israeli-designed jet fighter.

Mar. 15—President Nixon says in a news conference that the lifting of the embargo on arms to India and Pakistan "in no way jeopardizes the peace in the area."

Ambassador to India Daniel P. Moynihan informs Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the U.S. will not supply lethal arms to India or Pakistan.

President Nixon names retired Ambassador David K. E. Bruce to head the United States liaison office in Peking.

Mar. 22—Administrative officials indicate that the American military transport plane fired on yesterday by Libyan jets ignored a signal to land. The U.S. protests.

Mar. 28—A new U.S. commercial office opens in Moscow.

Mar. 30—The President accepts the resignation of Ellsworth Bunker as U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam. Graham A. Martin will be named to replace him.

Government

Mar. 1—In the fourth of his State of the Union messages, on human resources, President Nixon formally abandons his plan for a guaranteed annual income.

Mar. 3—G. Bradford Cook takes oath of office as the head of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Mar. 5—The administration agrees to the Senate's right to confirm top budget officials, but declares it unconstitutional to apply it to incumbents retroactively.

Mar. 6—The Justice Department orders the Bureau of Mines to withhold money the federal agency owes the coal companies until it collects unpaid fines for mine safety violations.

Mar. 10—In a radio address, President Nixon urges Congress to restore the death penalty for some federal crimes.

The U.S. District Court in Washington invalidates the U.S. Bureau of Mines system that imposes costly penalties on coal mine operators violating federal safety standards.

Mar. 11—In an exchange of gunfire at Wounded Knee, one FBI agent is shot and a militant Indian is injured. The Indians announce their secession from the United States, declaring themselves on a war footing.

Mar. 12—In a policy statement on executive privilege, President Nixon says that present and former members of his personal staff will not testify formally before congressional committees; his staff will provide information through informal contacts with "com-

mittees of the Congress in ways which preserve intact the constitutional separation of the branches."

Mar. 14—President Nixon details his proposals for criminal penalties in his 6th State of the Union message to Congress.

President Nixon's chief legal counsel, John W. Dean 3d, refuses an invitation to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewing the nomination of L. Patrick Gray, 3d as FBI director; he agrees to answer written questions on the nomination.

Mar. 15—Congress approves a bill to aid the mentally and physically handicapped—the first legislation to test the President's threat of veto.

Mar. 19—A House subcommittee makes public documents linking the administration with the Justice Department's settlement of antitrust suits against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, naming 6 high-ranking government officials including Vice-President Spiro Agnew and John W. Ehrlichman, assistant to the President.

The Senate completes congressional action requiring approval of Congress before Supreme Court-ordered changes in rules of evidence for the federal courts can be effective.

Mar. 20—Gray tells Senators that Attorney General Richard Kleindienst has ordered him not to discuss the Watergate case.

Mar. 21—President Nixon says that \$424 million in federal funds is available for 776,000 summer jobs for youths, but the bulk of the money—\$300 million—is to come from the Emergency Employment Assistance Act, a year-round adult program.

Mar. 22—Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on his nomination, Gray states that Mr. Nixon's chief legal counsel "probably" lied to FBI agents investigating the Watergate case.

President Nixon seeks almost unlimited tariff-regulating authority and a faster system of relief for domestic industries through restriction of imports in his first international economic report to Congress.

The Senate votes 66 to 22 to send the President the House-approved bill demanding administrative spending of \$120 million for water and sewer systems in rural areas; funds have been withheld by the Department of Agriculture.

Mar. 23—Security coordinator for the Committee to Re-elect the President James W. McCord, Jr., who has been convicted in the Watergate conspiracy, indicates in a letter read in the district court now sentencing Watergate principals that he and others were under "political pressure to plead guilty and remain silent."

President Nixon eases restrictions on oil imports.

Mar. 25—The Congressional Joint Economic Committee indicates unanimous agreement with the President that total government spending should be

kept at a ceiling of \$268 billion in the next fiscal year.

Mar. 27—A \$2.6-billion rehabilitation bill is vetoed by the President, who charges that it is part of a congressional "spending spree."

The Federal Aviation Administration bans most supersonic flights by civilian aircraft like the Anglo-French Concorde airliner over the U.S., starting April 27.

Mar. 28—The Senate select committee on the Watergate affair hears "significant" testimony from James W. McCord, Jr.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that in 1972 violent crime increased slightly and property crimes decreased so markedly that the over-all crime rate dropped for the first time since 1955.

Mar. 29—The President orders ceilings on wholesale and retail prices of beef, pork and lamb. The ceilings are to remain in effect "as long as is necessary to do the job."

Mar. 30—White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler announces that the President has issued an affirmative order to all White House staff members to testify if called before a grand jury about the Watergate case. Ziegler says the President is also willing to cooperate with the Senate subcommittee if cooperation does not do "violence to the separation of powers."

Labor and Industry

Mar. 13—The railroads and rail unions agree to a new 18-month contract that raises wages by 4 per cent and fringe benefits by 6.7 per cent for more than half a million workers. The agreement, still to be ratified by each of the 15 unions, is the first nationwide contract of a major industry in the administration's phase 3 period, and the first rail contract achieved before the expiration of an old one and without a strike.

Mar. 22—A Senate subcommittee reviews conflicting testimony of 3 officials of the International Telephone and Telegraph corporation in an inquiry into the company's alleged attempts to prevent the election of Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens. Witnesses include John A. McCone, former head of the CIA and now a director of ITT, Edward Gerity, senior vice president, and Jack D. Neal, the company's director of international relations.

Mar. 29—Ten steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America approve a labor agreement providing for binding arbitration in 1974 contract negotiations and prohibiting strikes or lockouts during the 1974 negotiations period; the contract will last through 1977.

Military

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Politics

(See also *Government*)

Mar. 9—The Finance Committee to Re-elect the President returns \$655,000 to 3 major donors: Robert H. Allen, Texas oilman, the source of \$89,000 that went to a Watergate defendant; Walter T. Duncan, Texas land speculator having financial difficulties; Robert L. Vesco, defendant in a Securities and Exchange Commission's investigation.

Mar. 12—The General Accounting Office alleges 4 law violations by the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President in the matter of a \$200,000 contribution by New Jersey financier Robert L. Vesco and refers the report to the Justice Department.

Supreme Court

Mar. 5—The Supreme Court rules 7 to 1 that the City of Petersburg, Va., does not have the right to annex property that shifts the population's political majority—from black to white.

Mar. 19—The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 vote, rules against the expulsion of a student for the dissemination of an obscenity in print because "the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of dual standards in the academic community with respect to the content of speech."

Mar. 20—The Court, in a 6-3 decision, exempts special-purpose governmental agencies from its one-man, one-vote mandate.

Mar. 21—The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 vote upholding Texas' school financing system, rules that states can finance their public school systems with property taxes.

The Court refuses to review the contempt citation of Harvard professor Samuel L. Popkin for keeping his information sources confidential; only Associate Justice William O. Douglas dissents.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl, War in Indochina*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Mar. 26—The government releases Truong Dinh Dzu, a peace candidate and political opponent in the 1967 presidential election, who was in jail 5 years.

Mar. 28—President Nguyen Van Thieu formally launches his Democracy party, one of two to survive the requirements of a new law, 2 days before he leaves for a trip to the United States.

ZAIRE

(See *Mauritania*)



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